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HABEAS CORPUS AND DUE PROCESS
Brandon L. Garrett †
The writ of habeas corpus and the right to due process have long been
linked together, but their relationship has never been more unsettled or important. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States detained
hundreds of suspected terrorists who later brought legal challenges using the
writ. In the first of the landmark Supreme Court cases addressing those detentions, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the plurality chiefly relied on the Due Process
Clause to explain what procedures a court must follow. Scholars assumed
due process would govern the area. Yet in Boumediene v. Bush, the Court
did not take the due process path and instead held that the Suspension
Clause extended habeas corpus process to noncitizen detainees at Guantánamo Bay. Boumediene correctly grounded the analysis in the Suspension
Clause, not the Due Process Clause. The Court held that the Suspension
Clause demands a traditional habeas process, simply asking whether the detention is legally and factually authorized. This view challenges the set of
standards that judges currently use in executive detention cases and also has
implications for domestic habeas; it could ground innocence claims in the
Suspension Clause. More broadly, this Suspension Clause theory reflects
commonalities in the structure of statutes and case law regulating habeas
corpus across its array of applications to executive detention and postconviction review. Habeas review now plays a far more central role in the complex
regulation of detention than scholars predicted, because habeas review does
not depend on underlying due process rights. A judge instead focuses on
whether a detention is authorized. As a result, habeas review can inversely
play its most crucial role when prior process is inadequate. Put simply, the
Suspension Clause can ensure that habeas corpus begins where due process
ends.
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“[S]tandards of due process have evolved over the centuries. But
the nature and purpose of habeas corpus have remained remarkably constant.”
– Justice William J. Brennan1
“The role of habeas corpus is to determine the legality of executive
detention, not to supply the omitted process necessary to make it
legal.”
– Justice Antonin G. Scalia2
1
2

Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963).
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 576 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The writ of habeas corpus and the right to due process have long
been linked together. The Supreme Court has called “[v]indication
of due process” the “historic office” of habeas corpus.3 Following hazy
origins at common law, habeas corpus and due process together
“formed a powerful current in the stream of constitutionalism.”4 Over
time, judges connected notions of due process to the development of
the writ of habeas corpus,5 the “great writ of liberty” that allows a
judge to inquire into the legality of a prisoner’s detention.6 Nevertheless, until recently, federal courts have had few occasions7 to define
the relationship between the Suspension Clause of Article I, which
limits Congress’s ability to suspend the “Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus,”8 and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which state that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property “without due process of law.”9 Instead, the
Suspension Clause appeared dormant, its meaning “obscure” and
“elusive.”10 The Suspension Clause does not affirmatively define “the
power of the court” in “cases in which this great writ shall be issued,”11
as Chief Justice John Marshall put it; rather, the Clause assumes the
existence of the writ and names conditions for suspension. The Supreme Court has repeatedly avoided defining the Clause’s content.12
In contrast, the Court often meticulously defines the procedures the
Due Process Clause requires.13 Scholars noting the Court’s avoidance
of the problem stated that the relationship between the Suspension

3

Fay, 372 U.S. at 402.
See DANIEL JOHN MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA: DUALISM OF POWER
AND LIBERTY 5 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1966).
5
See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
6
The U.S. Supreme Court has used the phrase “great writ of liberty” in several cases.
See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 148 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., opinion); Darr v. Burford,
339 U.S. 200, 225 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 539, 619 (1842).
7
See infra Parts I.C, II.A–B.
8
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
9
U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
10
David L. Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Detention: Another View, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 59, 59 (2006); see also George Rutherglen, Structural Uncertainty over Habeas
Corpus & the Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals, 5 GREEN BAG (n.s.) 397, 398 (2002) (“After
more than two hundred years, we still do not know the scope and dimensions of the protection that [habeas corpus] affords against executive detention.”).
11
Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201 (1830).
12
See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 n.13 (2001) (“The fact that this Court
would be required to answer the difficult question of what the Suspension Clause protects
is in and of itself a reason to avoid answering the constitutional questions that would be
raised by concluding that review was barred entirely.”); infra notes 68–72 and accompanying text.
13
See infra Part I.B.4.
4
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Clause and the Due Process Clause remained “completely
unsettled.”14
The relationship between the Suspension Clause and the Due
Process Clause has sweeping implications for the detention of suspected terrorists and military engagements in multiple countries after
September 11, 2001. In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court for
the first time clearly gave the Suspension Clause independent force as
an affirmative source of judicial power to adjudicate habeas petitions
and as a source of meaningful process to prisoners in custody.15 As a
consequence of this decision, Congress now cannot enact jurisdictionstripping legislation to deny executive detainees access to judicial review of the type that it has twice tried and failed to do in the past
decade.16 A noncitizen detained as a national security threat may now
have procedural rights to contest the detention.17 Even as the Executive has crafted nuanced positions on power and procedure for detaining persons for national security reasons, and even as Congress
has adopted new detention-authorizing legislation,18 the judiciary
continues to play a central role, though sometimes unwillingly and
deferentially, in detention review.19 Apart from these specific developments, I argue that the reinvigorated Suspension Clause jurisprudence will continue to have ripple effects across all areas regulated by
habeas corpus.
What process must the government use to ensure that it detains
the correct people? The traditional assumption was that the Due Process Clause provided the answers. Judges and scholars described a
14
Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due Process and the Suspension Clause: A Study in the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 96 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1364
(2010); see also Joshua Alexander Geltzer, Of Suspension, Due Process, and Guantanamo: The
Reach of the Fifth Amendment After Boumediene and the Relationship Between Habeas Corpus and
Due Process, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 719, 720 (2012) (describing “the relationship between
habeas corpus rights and due process protections” as “a surprisingly under-explored
topic”). I do not address the novel argument that the Due Process Clauses supersede the
Suspension Clause, such that “a suspension of habeas corpus must be unconstitutional
unless it satisfies the demands of the Due Process Clause.” Redish & McNamara, supra, at
1396.
15
See infra Part II.
16
See infra notes 235–40 and accompanying text.
17
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008) (holding that noncitizen
petitioners designated as enemy combatants “do have the habeas corpus privilege” and
that the government’s existing procedures were “not an adequate and effective substitute
for habeas corpus”).
18
See Press Release, President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on H.R.
1540 (Dec. 31, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/
31/statement-president-hr-1540 (citing the Administration’s “effective, sustainable framework for the detention, interrogation and trial of suspected terrorists”); infra note 333 and
accompanying text (discussing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012).
19
See infra Part III for analysis of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals case law in
particular.
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functional relationship in which due process supplied the rights while
habeas provided the procedural means to vindicate them. Justice
Antonin Scalia expressed this view in its starkest form in his INS v. St.
Cyr dissent, arguing that the Suspension Clause “does not guarantee
any content to (or even the existence of) the writ of habeas corpus.”20
Judges and scholars have long assumed that due process offers more
protections than habeas corpus, or that the substance of habeas is coextensive with the Due Process Clause.21 Others have suggested that
the Suspension Clause has a “structural” role, entwined with other individual rights guarantees.22 The U.S. government, in the wake of the
September 11, 2001 attacks, adopted the view that noncitizens captured and detained abroad had no due process rights and thus no
habeas remedy, and the D.C. Circuit agreed.23
In two cases that reshaped habeas jurisprudence, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, decided in 2004,24 and Boumediene, decided in 2008,25 the Court
20
533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. (“[T]he text [of the Suspension
Clause] does not confer a right to habeas relief, but merely sets forth when the Privilege of
the Writ may be suspended . . . .” (first and second alterations in original) (quoting RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1369 (4th ed. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
21
See id.; WILLIAM F. DUKER, The Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Constitution, and State Habeas
for Federal Prisoners, in A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 126, 126 (1980) (arguing the Suspension Clause was designed to protect availability of state habeas for federal
prisoners); Redish & McNamara, supra note 14, at 1365 (arguing that the Due Process
Clause preempts the Suspension Clause); Shapiro, supra note 10, at 63–65 (viewing the
Suspension Clause as an affirmative guarantee of habeas availability, while also viewing “the
habeas corpus remedy [as] essential to the full realization” of other rights, including due
process); Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 383
(2006) [hereinafter Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?] (“[A]t their respective cores,
the right to due process and the Great Writ are coextensive.”); Amanda L. Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV. 901, 921, 924 (2012) [hereinafter Tyler, Forgotten Core Meaning] (noting that “[b]y the time of the Founding, the privilege
had evolved to encompass not just a generic right to due process, but also a particular
demand,” a “specific right” not to be jailed outside formal criminal process).
22
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2070–71 (2007) (emphasizing
“the structural role of the Suspension Clause within the Constitution”); Tyler, Is Suspension
a Political Question?, supra note 21, at 342, 384–86 (describing “the relationship between the
Great Writ and core due process values”). For a related view that the Clauses should be
“read together,” see David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as
Limits on Congress’s Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2484 (1998).
23
See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 991–93 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that
“the Constitution does not confer rights on aliens without property or presence within the
United States” and characterizing the Suspension Clause as just another source of constitutional rights to which such aliens have no claim); Response to Petitions for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and Motion to Dismiss or for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Memorandum in
Support at 26–27, Hicks v. Bush, No. 02-CV-0299 (D.D.C. Oct. 4, 2004) (“[N]on-resident
aliens in U.S. custody overseas do not have constitutional rights that can be enforced in a
proceeding seeking a writ of habeas corpus.” (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,
778 (1950))).
24
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
25
553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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connected the Suspension Clause and the Due Process Clause in a
new way. Hamdi seemed to indicate that the Due Process Clause approach had triumphed. The Hamdi plurality applied the cost-benefit
due process test from Mathews v. Eldridge26 to outline the procedural
rights of citizens who challenge their detention.27 Following Hamdi,
the precise scope of what due process required seemed the “looming
question” for the future of executive detention.28 In response, the
government hastily implemented administrative screening procedures
for detainees, ostensibly to comply with the bare minimum that due
process appeared to require.29
In Boumediene, the Court chose a different constitutional path.
The Court did not discuss whether Guantánamo detainees had due
process rights, but instead held that the Suspension Clause independently supplies process to ensure review of executive detention.30 The
Court put to rest the notion that the Suspension Clause is an empty
vessel and regulates only the conditions for congressional suspension
of the writ. Instead, the Court held that the Suspension Clause itself
extended “the fundamental procedural protections of habeas
corpus.”31 The Court’s view complements recent scholarship examining the common law origins of habeas corpus.32 However, while an26

424 U.S. 319 (1976).
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528–29 (plurality opinion).
28
Fallon, Jr. & Meltzer, supra note 22, at 2093.
29
See infra notes 164–69 and accompanying text.
30
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 785 (“Even if we were to assume that the [new procedures] satisfy due process standards, it would not end our inquiry.”). Scholars have given
this landmark holding much-deserved attention. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus,
Suspension, and Guantánamo: The Boumediene Decision, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1 (“[T]he
Supreme Court, . . . for the first time, clearly held . . . that the Constitution’s Suspension
Clause . . . affirmatively guarantees access to the courts to seek the writ of habeas corpus
(or an adequate substitute) in order to test the legality of executive detention.”); Gerald L.
Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After Boumediene v. Bush, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 537, 538 (2010) (“The Supreme Court had never before found a violation of the Suspension Clause, and the holding of Boumediene gives its reasoning a precedential significance that earlier discussions lack.”); Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access
to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2107–08 (2009) (“Ronald Dworkin may not have been exaggerating when he referred to . . . Boumediene v. Bush as
‘one of the most important Supreme Court decisions in recent years.’” (footnote omitted)
(quoting Ronald Dworkin, Why It Was a Great Victory, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 14, 2008, at 18,
18)).
31
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798.
32
See, e.g., Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text,
Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575, 583, 586–88 (2008) (describing how “the Suspension Clause carried the writ of habeas corpus out of English practice
and into American law with little additional jurisprudential baggage” and finding that in
Anglo-American jurisprudence, the Great Writ would run where “officials of the king, or
his equivalent, were exercising custody,” regardless of location, with judges “ready to investigate the factual and legal ground of imprisonment orders premised on allegations that a
person was an enemy alien, a danger to the state, or both”). But see Stephen I. Vladeck, The
New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941, 967–68 (2011) (reviewing PAUL D. HALLI27
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swering the Suspension Clause question, the ruling created another
puzzle. The Court held that a prisoner should have a “meaningful
opportunity” to demonstrate unlawful confinement, but it did not
specify what process the Suspension Clause ensures, nor to what degree due process concerns influence the analysis.33 Lower court rulings elaborating on the process for reviewing detainee petitions have
displayed confusion as to which sources to rely on.34 This Article tries
to untangle this important knot.
One view of Boumediene would treat the Court’s decision as a
break from the past, grounded in political or separation-of-powers
concerns, but with little authority supporting its interpretation of the
Suspension Clause. Scholars have largely focused on when and how a
government can suspend habeas.35 This may be due to the enigmatic
text of the Suspension Clause, which speaks of a “[p]rivilege” that
“shall not be suspended.”36 Because of this language, even scholarship
analyzing substantive aspects of the Court’s habeas rulings tends to
focus on when and whether Congress may authorize detention (or on
why the Court tries to avoid substance and tends to dwell on procedure).37 As noted, scholars often assume due process and habeas
corpus rights necessarily accompany each other.38 Yet the Boumediene
DAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010)) (criticizing the Boumediene court
for treating the citizenship and status of the detainee and the nature of the detention sites
as relevant to the reach of the Suspension Clause when “Halliday’s research establishes that
the jurisdiction of King’s Bench to issue writs of habeas corpus at the time of the Founding
was effectively indifferent to the status or location of the detainee”).
33
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 729; see infra Part II.B.3.
34
See infra Part III.
35
This argument has implications for a related question, extensively debated,
whether a suspension of habeas closes access to due process remedies (and more broadly,
whether a formal suspension can authorize otherwise unconstitutional detention). The
problem has rarely arisen, since habeas has rarely been suspended, and I do not directly
address that question here. See Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1533, 1560–62 (2007) (arguing suspension of habeas removes
merely one remedy for violation of underlying rights); Shapiro, supra note 10, at 83–86
(arguing detention authorized by a valid suspension is lawful); Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension
as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 604–05 (2009) (rejecting the “narrow view . . . that
a suspension extinguishes the judicial power to order a prisoner’s discharge” but that ordinarily illegal arrests “remain unlawful and unconstitutional” (footnote omitted)).
36
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
37
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV 2047, 2122 (2005); Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1016 (2008) (exploring how “‘war
on terror’ litigation in U.S. courts has been fixated on process”); Shapiro, supra note 10, at
60–61.
38
See supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text. I do not address here important
questions of whether due process should run to Guantánamo Bay or other detention sites
abroad. See, e.g., Geltzer, supra note 14, at 719–21; Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 410–11 (2009)
(“The logic of Boumediene’s five-justice majority opinion is that the Due Process Clause
binds the executive worldwide . . . .”); Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution
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Court reaffirmed that habeas rights may do work that due process
might not.39
In this Article, I argue that Boumediene can and should provide a
theory of the nature and structure of habeas corpus.40 While the result in Boumediene may not have been inevitable, it is in fact well supported. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that
“[h]abeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention.”41
Behind such statements lies a longstanding and consistent treatment
of habeas process as independent of due process. Boumediene rests
heavily on rulings stretching back decades, particularly in executive
detention cases, which themselves flow from the common law habeas
practice.42 These cases show how habeas process is independent from
due process and has great force when due process protections are
weakest.
To ground this understanding of the differences between due
process and habeas, in Part I, I question a possibly overstated historical connection between habeas corpus and due process, tracing them
both to Magna Carta, in a celebratory account of the progress of individual liberty. Due process and habeas corpus share common law origins and core concerns with arbitrary deprivations of liberty,43 but
habeas draws on different sources. I contrast habeas process,
grounded in the same process used at common law, with the concept
After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 286 (2009) (“The characterization of
Guantanamo as effectively U.S. territory for constitutional purposes probably means that
the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment apply there . . . .”). By contrast, the
D.C. Circuit concluded that although Boumediene held that Suspension Clause rights run to
Guantánamo Bay, due process rights do not. See Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (“[T]he Court in Boumediene disclaimed any intention to disturb existing law
governing the extraterritorial reach of any constitutional provisions, other than the Suspension Clause.”)
39
See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
40
This subject falls within what Jenny Martinez calls “process as substance.” Martinez,
supra note 37, at 1041. Gerald Neuman’s essay, exploring this problem, draws attention to
the Court’s Suspension Clause and Due Process methodology, describing how it “invites
future debate” and has profound implications. Neuman, supra note 30, at 578. For an
excellent pre-Boumediene piece sharing a focus on habeas grounded in judicial power, see
Jared A. Goldstein, Habeas Without Rights, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 1165 (arguing that individual
rights are not necessary for habeas, which is rather a source of judicial power).
41
Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301
(2001) (“At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing
the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been
strongest.” (footnote omitted)).
42
See infra Part II.B. I second the view of Gerald Neuman that “[t]he account of the
Suspension Clause in Boumediene grows incrementally out of established practice, and
makes no revolutionary break.” Neuman, supra note 30, at 565.
43
See Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, supra note 21, at 383 (noting the sentiments of William Blackstone and Sir Edward Coke that due process and habeas corpus are
linked by their concern for personal liberty); infra notes 114, 166, 247 and accompanying
text.
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of due process, which contains a sprawling modern procedural and
substantive jurisprudence drawing from diverse areas (e.g., substantive
constitutional law, criminal procedure, civil procedure, civil rights law,
cost-benefit analysis, standards for incorporating Bill of Rights provisions, and fundamental rights jurisprudence).44 Real perils arise from
analogizing heterogeneous due process standards to habeas process;
there is no neat overlap. This disjunction is particularly highlighted
by the fact that habeas corpus offers a prisoner process in two ways:
First, judges provide habeas process when reviewing whether a detention is authorized, which includes examining whether the detention
has adequate factual and legal support.45 Second, in doing so, the
judge may examine whether earlier proceedings comported with due
process.46 The second function overlaps with due process, but not the
first, broader function.
Indeed, scholars have not adequately appreciated how habeas
corpus can offer far more than due process. In the executive detention context, if there has been no prior judicial process, habeas process—a federal judge asking whether the detention is authorized,
often focusing on difficult factual questions—may be particularly central. In decades-old immigration rulings, the Court held that for certain noncitizens with negligible due process rights, habeas corpus
permits an inquiry into the legal and factual authorization for the detention.47 That setting has long made clear how a judge can provide
habeas process where a due process claim would not permit doing so.
In contrast, in contexts involving prior judicial process, such as a criminal conviction, habeas corpus may offer much less than due
process.48
This aspect of habeas corpus explains why it, and not due process, would come to play the crucial role in judicial review of national
security detention. In Part II, I develop a theory for how, in the wake
of the September 11, 2001 attacks and subsequent military action, the
Hamdi plurality relied chiefly on due process but indicated that
habeas process also served a role.49 I also examine how the Court in
Boumediene, more carefully than ever before, determined that habeas
provides protection distinct from due process.50 The Court rejected
the view that the Due Process Clause dominates the Suspension
Clause. To fill in the outlines of habeas process, the Boumediene Court
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.A.
Id.
See infra note 171 and accompanying text; infra Part III.A.
See, e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–90 (1994).
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
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viewed the Suspension Clause as compatible with due process, not dependent on or coextensive with it.51
In Part III, I develop implications of that relationship between
habeas corpus and due process. The Boumediene Court directed lower
courts to elaborate habeas procedures to examine whether the detention of Guantánamo detainees was authorized. In response, judges
crafted rules—multifariously modeled on civil, criminal, and postconviction law—by cherry picking from a raft of due process standards,
sometimes from irrelevant contexts, including jurisprudence drawn
from the postconviction context in which there already had been a
criminal trial.
Discomfort with the institution of habeas corpus has led judges to
adopt vague and unsettled procedures. For example, the D.C. Circuit
reasons that review of enemy combatant detention is not a “mere extension[ ] of an existing doctrine” but “a whole new branch of the
tree.”52 Yet the sparse but powerful habeas process is really the trunk
of the tree. Judges should draw habeas process directly from the core
of “traditional habeas corpus process,”53 which remains largely unchanged from common law practice and the earliest federal statutes.
While judges must develop the details of how habeas functions in detention challenges, they should draw that process from habeas jurisprudence designed to provide a judge with power to scrutinize the
factual and legal authorization for a detention, rather than, for example, sources from postconviction law.54 Boumediene demands such a
focus.
In Part IV, I explore the broader potential significance of this
view of the Suspension Clause. Habeas corpus has developed along
different paths, with different statutes and case law regulating postconviction and executive detainee petitions. The Suspension Clause
provides a unified structure. Chief Justice John Roberts, dissenting in
Boumediene, noted that habeas is “traditionally more limited in some
contexts than in others.”55 The core habeas process explains how
context matters: in each area, habeas takes on a greater role where
due process is constrained. Judges have the strongest Suspension
Clause obligation to review legal and factual questions where there
was no prior adequate judicial review of detention. This has implications for disparate strands of habeas corpus. For postconviction
51

See infra notes 289–92 and accompanying text.
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
53
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 778 (2008).
54
See generally Lee Kovarsky, A Constitutional Theory of Habeas Power (Univ. of Md. Legal
Studies, Research Paper No. 2012-27, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2061471
(theorizing that the Suspension Clause supplies an Article III habeas power to federal
judges absent a suspension of the writ).
55
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 814 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
52

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\98-1\CRN102.txt

2012]

unknown

Seq: 11

1-NOV-12

15:10

57

HABEAS CORPUS AND DUE PROCESS

habeas, this reading of the Clause provides new constitutional support
for a claim of actual innocence, which the Court has recognized only
hypothetically. Similarly, in immigration law, this view of habeas has
implications for important unsettled questions regarding judicial review following the REAL ID Act of 2005.56
Congress and the Executive have largely accommodated, in the
wake of Boumediene, a system in which judicial review plays a central
role in detention cases, even if judges remain deferential both to congressional authorization for detention and executive procedures for
screening and release of detainees.57 The Suspension Clause may facilitate this equilibrium better than a due process approach, which
would focus more on procedure and less on substance. A judge asking whether the Due Process Clause was violated focuses on the minimal adequacy of general procedures, which may not necessarily
require a judicial process. A judge asking whether the Suspension
Clause was violated asks a different question: whether the process preserves an adequate and effective role for federal judges to independently review authorization of each individual detainee. The specific
question for the judge is whether a person is in fact detained lawfully,
which is a fundamental question of substance. Despite connections
between habeas corpus and due process, the habeas judge’s preoccupation with authorization instead of procedure suggests important
reasons for the concepts to remain separate. Habeas corpus and due
process can share an inverse relationship,58 meaning that the Suspension Clause can continue to do its work standing alone.
I
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN HABEAS CORPUS
DUE PROCESS

AND

A. The Great Writ
The writ of habeas corpus has a much-celebrated and storied history that brings with it “immediate incantation of the Great Writ.”59
The Supreme Court has lauded the “indispensable function of the
Great Writ”60 that “indisputably holds an honored position in our jurisprudence.”61 The traditional purpose of habeas corpus is elemen56
See infra Part IV.A. Congress enacted the REAL ID Act as Division II of a 2005
supplemental defense spending bill. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13,
§§ 101–106, 119 Stat. 231, 302–11 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1778 (2006)).
57
See infra Part III.
58
See infra Part IV.A.
59
Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.
CHI. L. REV. 142, 142 (1970).
60
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 452 (1953).
61
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982).
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tal but powerful: to allow a judge to review the legality of a prisoner’s
detention.62
Judges have variously described the writ of habeas corpus as a
“right,”63 a “remedy,”64 a “procedural right,”65 or a “mechanism.”66
Those characterizations are each partially correct, but taken alone
they may be misleading. Habeas corpus is a writ. It is not a modern
cause of action requiring an individual to assert a legal right; it arises
from a common law writ. As the Court noted in Boumediene, the Suspension Clause refers not to any positive right or remedy but to “[t]he
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus,”67 which shall not be suspended.68 Despite this, scholars and courts have long debated
whether the Suspension Clause assures any minimum scope or content to the writ and whether lower federal courts, which Congress
need not create, must entertain the writ to provide meaningful remedies.69 In focusing on these issues, scholars seem to be imposing a
modern question—what is the scope of the habeas right—on a
premodern text with a common law answer—habeas is not a right, but
judges may entertain a prayer for the writ and require the jailer to
justify the legality of the detention.
The Court gingerly avoided addressing the independent force of
the writ before deciding Boumediene. For example, in Ex parte Bollman,
the Court’s first ruling on the subject, Chief Justice Marshall famously
noted that federal jurisdiction must be given by “written law,” but that
the first Congress might have felt some “obligation,” acting under the
“immediate influence of [the] injunction” of the Suspension Clause,
62
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745 (2008) (“The [Suspension] Clause protects
the rights of the detained by affirming the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the
jailer to account.”).
63
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 993 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“The fact that the Suspension Clause abuts the prohibitions on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, provisions well-accepted to protect individual liberty, further supports viewing the habeas
privilege as a core individual right.” (quoting Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, supra
note 21, at 374 & n.227)).
64
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (describing the Great Writ as “affording . . . a
swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement” (quoting Sec’y
of State for Home Affairs v. O’Brien, [1923] A.C. 603 (H.L.) 609 (appeal taken from
Eng.))).
65
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 802 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Habeas is most fundamentally a procedural right, a mechanism for contesting the legality of executive detention.”).
66
Id.
67
U.S. CONST. art. I., § 9, cl. 2.
68
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 743 (“The word ‘privilege’ was used, perhaps, to avoid mentioning some rights to the exclusion of others.”).
69
See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1162 (6th ed. 2009) (“The constitutional text appears to presuppose the existence of habeas corpus jurisdiction, but it does not affirmatively guarantee a
right to habeas corpus . . . .”); Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970
DUKE L.J. 605, 607 (viewing the Suspension Clause as “a direction . . . to make the habeas
privilege routinely available”).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\98-1\CRN102.txt

2012]

unknown

Seq: 13

HABEAS CORPUS AND DUE PROCESS

1-NOV-12

15:10

59

to provide “life and activity” to the writ.70 The Court more recently
stated in Felker v. Turpin that it assumed “for purposes of decision
here, that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution refers to the writ
as it exists today, rather than as it existed in 1789.”71 The Court took a
different stance in INS v. St. Cyr, stating that the Suspension Clause
might “at the absolute minimum” protect the writ “as it existed in
1789.”72
While the Court had avoided stating whether the Suspension
Clause affirmatively guarantees some habeas remedy, it had clearly established that habeas serves a core purpose “as a means of reviewing
the legality of Executive detention.”73 Effectuating this purpose may
require courts to examine the legal and factual justifications for holding a detainee. Once a petition is filed, the government has the burden of showing that a detention is authorized. This burden reflects a
principle central to the concept of due process: deprivation of an individual’s liberty must be in accordance with the law. What judges conducting habeas review do, though, which is different from conducting
a due process analysis, is to inquire whether the detention is lawful or
factually supported.
A judge examining a habeas petition provides process in two
ways. First, a judge reviewing a habeas petition may examine law and
facts concerning the prior process used to place a person in custody.74
Postconviction petitions filed by prisoners seeking review of their state
criminal convictions, in which judges must consider whether the state
violated the defendant’s constitutional rights, dominate the federal
habeas docket. The second-largest category is postconviction motions
by federal prisoners challenging federal convictions, although they
are filed chiefly under a statutory analogue to habeas.75
Habeas corpus has a second purpose, originally its primary purpose, in which a judge independently examines the justification for
the detention.76 A detainee filing a writ need not allege a violation of
a right, just that custody is unauthorized, thereby placing the burden
on the Executive to show cause for the detention and requiring the
70

8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 94–95 (1807).
518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996).
72
533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (quoting Felker, 518 U.S. at 664); see also FALLON, JR. ET AL.,
supra note 69, at 1162–63 (discussing the Court’s INS v. St. Cyr decision).
73
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301.
74
See FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 69, at 1154 (“The primary contemporary use of
federal habeas corpus is as a postconviction remedy for prisoners claiming that an error of
federal law—almost always of federal constitutional law—infected the judicial proceedings
that resulted in their detention.”).
75
Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006).
76
See FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 69, at 1154 (“[P]ostconviction relief was not the
original office of habeas corpus, which focused instead on whether extra-judicial detention—most often by the executive—was authorized by law.”).
71
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judge to review the legality of and authorization for the detention.77
Of course, judges have less to review where prior judges already developed a record and examined the detention. As a result, independent
habeas process has become less commonly used.
This traditional habeas process remains crucial, however, where
the Executive detains a person without prior judicial process. In general, habeas “protections have been strongest” when “reviewing the
legality of Executive detention.”78 Immigration law, which I examine
in Part III,79 also contains decisions, dating back many decades, that
emphasize how habeas plays a role even without an underlying due
process right.80 This original function of habeas process, with its common law origins,81 has become particularly important in national security detentions post-9/11.
B. Common Law Origins
Celebratory accounts of habeas corpus and due process trace
back to King John pronouncing Magna Carta to the barons assembled
at Runnymede, assuring them that the King was not above the law and
that they could not be imprisoned or punished except according to
the law of the land.82 As Justice David Souter wrote in Hamdi, “[W]e
are heirs to a tradition given voice 800 years ago by Magna Carta,
which, on the barons’ insistence, confined executive power by ‘the law
of the land.’”83 The Supreme Court, in Fay v. Noia, hailed “the union
of the right to due process drawn from Magna Charta and the remedy
of habeas corpus accomplished in the [seventeenth] century.”84 Many
overstate the historical connection between habeas corpus and due
process to Magna Carta. Nevertheless, habeas and due process were,
and are, conceptually and practically connected. What is the relationship? An examination of the origins of both concepts shed light on
that question.
1. Origins of Habeas Corpus
Habeas corpus practice remains, in some respects, closely linked
to its common law origins. The Supreme Court describes habeas
77
See id. at 1153 (“[A]n individual whose liberty is restrained may file a petition seeking issuance of the writ, and thereby require a custodian . . . to justify the restraint as
lawful.”).
78
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301.
79
See infra Part III.A.
80
See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
81
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982) (noting that habeas has “roots deep into
English common law”).
82
See infra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
83
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 552 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring).
84
372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963).
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corpus as “a writ antecedent to statute, . . . throwing its root deep into
the genius of our common law.”85 As Paul Halliday powerfully shows
in a book that reshaped our understanding of habeas corpus, the
common law writ was not based on a modern concept of individual
rights, but rather a royal prerogative and the King’s grace and mercy,
grounded in a judge’s command to a jailer in order to inspect
whether a person was properly detained.86
Traditional historians traced habeas corpus to Magna Carta, in
which feudal barons in England secured a charter from King John
pronouncing that no person could be imprisoned or punished “excepting by the legal judgment of his peers, or by the laws of the
land.”87 William Church cited to Magna Carta as “form[ing] a basis
for hundreds of years on which prisoners unlawfully confined could
ground their demand for liberty.”88 However, the notion that habeas
corpus originated from Magna Carta was a “myth” and “the two were
unrelated in origin,” as Daniel Meador developed in a classic treatment.89 Paul Halliday and G. Edward White write that in an “idealized
version of habeas corpus, the history of the writ becomes a history of
the ever-greater manifestation of ideals of fairness, due process, and
humanitarianism associated with the ‘Anglo-American tradition’ of
justice under law.”90 Magna Carta did not name “a specific process to
prevent imprisonment contrary to ‘the law of the land,’” and “law of
the land” referred to a host of broad concepts.91
Habeas corpus originated before Magna Carta from a shifting set
of mundane writs that courts employed to “have the body,” or to order
the moving of prisoners, bringing them before the court and holding
sheriffs and other custodians accountable.92 The modern form of the
writ emerged centuries later. Halliday’s examination of records of the
King’s Bench revealed how judges gradually transformed habeas
corpus into a means to call to account, on behalf of the King, jailers
who detained subjects in a manner “repugnant to common law and
common weal.”93 In the seventeenth century, leading up to the En85
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Williams v.
Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 484 n.2 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
86
HALLIDAY, supra note 32, at 7.
87
See WILLIAM S. CHURCH, A TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS § 2 (Gaunt,
Inc. 1997) (1893) (quoting RICHARD THOMSON, AN HISTORICAL ESSAY ON THE MAGNA
CHARTA OF KING JOHN 83 (London, John Major & Robert Jennings 1829)).
88
Id. §§ 2, 3(a) (recognizing the use of other “ancient writs” before Magna Carta).
89
MEADOR, supra note 4, at 5.
90
Halliday & White, supra note 32, at 581.
91
HALLIDAY, supra note 32, at 16, 137–38.
92
Id. at 17, 40–41; see also MEADOR, supra note 4, at 8–9 (describing early English
orders used to bring a person before the court).
93
HALLIDAY, supra note 32, at 22, 27.
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glish Civil War and Restoration, justices used habeas as a powerful
check on other courts, officials, and even Parliament.94
This common law process involved legal and factual review of detention.95 A case began with the filing of a prayer for the writ, which,
if granted, permitted the judge to send a writ asking the jailer to explain the cause of the commitment and to produce the prisoner in
court. The jailer complied by sending a return and producing the
prisoner.96 In the return, the jailer might raise a defense that common law, statute, or custom authorized the detention. The judge
might then order the release of the prisoner. A release might not be
based on a violation of a right, but rather because the jailer could not
show the detention was authorized by law or sufficient facts.97
During the writ’s seventeenth-century heyday, justices began to
not only inquire into the cause of the detention, but also the initial
arrest.98 As Halliday has shown, judges would even make these inquiries in cases in which another court ordered the detention, including
courts of record such as the Privy Council and Star Chamber.99 The
inquiries increased “factual demands made by the writ” and required
justices to “read deeply into the returns.”100 Justices did not adopt a
particular standard of proof when assessing facts, but “followed the
facts of cases rather than rules”; review could depend on elements of
the statute providing the basis for detention.101
Historians traditionally repeated “[t]he apparent rule against
controverting the return,”102 suggesting that the factual inquiry was
limited to the jailer’s statement in support of detention.103 Halliday
94
See id. at 30–31 (“During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, supervising
wrongs created by statutes formed most of the writ’s business. In the 1640s, . . . [s]ome
parliamentary leaders took it upon themselves to reform the nation’s conscience as they
reformed its governance, . . . [and] many used imprisonment orders to convince the unconvinced. King’s Bench met them head on . . . .”).
95
See Marc D. Falkoff, Back to Basics: Habeas Corpus Procedures and Long-Term Executive
Detention, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 961, 974 (2009) (describing how judges would “deploy a host
of procedural tools for inquiring into the factual justification for the prisoner’s detention”); Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Untold Story of Noncriminal Habeas Corpus and the 1996 Immigration Acts, 107 YALE L.J. 2509, 2535–36 (1998) (“[J]udges were not entirely precluded
from reviewing facts on habeas corpus. . . . The main constraint on judicial review of the
facts in a return to habeas corpus was the principle that juries must answer to questions of
fact and judges to questions of law.”).
96
See FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 69, at 1153.
97
See HALLIDAY, supra note 32, at 104–06.
98
Id. at 106.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 53.
101
Id. at 104–05.
102
Id. at 109.
103
Cf. Fallon, Jr. & Meltzer, supra note 22, at 2102 (“[E]arly practice was not consistent: courts occasionally permitted factual inquiries when no other opportunity for judicial
review existed.”); Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of
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has powerfully shown, by examining King’s Bench records, that contrary to the letter of this oft-repeated rule,104 judges “generated myriad ways to elicit evidence,” including through written and in-person
testimony.105 Thus, “judges routinely considered extrinsic evidence
such as in-court testimony, third party affidavits, documents, and expert opinions to scrutinize the factual and legal basis for detention.”106 During this evolution of the writ, Parliament enacted the
English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, which, though celebrated, may in
fact have done little to supplement common law habeas practice.107
Habeas corpus did far more than allow judges to supervise compliance with the then-limited notion of “due process,” which applied
chiefly to felon pretrial process. Instead, habeas corpus permitted
broad supervision of the legality of and factual support for a detention. As I describe, in many respects this traditional habeas process
remains the practice today in federal executive detentions, based on
both current federal habeas statutes and the process federal courts
have developed.
2. Origins of Due Process
In England, the term “due process” was not in use until long after
Magna Carta, which pronounced that no person could be imprisoned
or punished “excepting by the legal judgment of his peers, or by the
laws of the land.”108 The term “law of the land,” was broad and referred to statutes, custom, common law, and prerogative writs.109 The
narrower term “due process” was first used centuries later in a 1354
statute, stating that “no Man of what Estate or Condition that he be,
shall be . . . taken, nor imprisoned . . . nor put to Death, without being
Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 986 (1998) (noting that the “general statement” that “the
petitioner could not controvert the facts stated in the return” “papered over exceptions”).
104
The supposed rule had origins in dicta by Lord Coke, which in fact related, as
Halliday describes, to an unrelated rule regarding suits for trespass or false imprisonment
filed by former prisoners seeking damages after their release. HALLIDAY, supra note 32, at
108–10. The rule operated to separate civil actions seeking compensation after release
from those seeking release from unauthorized detention in the first instance. Judges did
not, despite repeating the “apparent rule,” require a separate action to challenge facts in a
return. Id. at 109.
105
Id. at 109–11.
106
Brief of Legal Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 29,
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (No. 06-1195).
107
31 Car. 2, c. 2 (Eng.); see HALLIDAY, supra note 32, at 34 (“The . . . Habeas Corpus
Act of 1679 had a . . . mixed effect. Many of the practices it prescribed had long been used
in King’s Bench.” (footnote omitted)); MEADOR, supra note 4, at 25 (“[C]elebrated though
it is, the Act dealt with no profound questions and introduced no new principles.”).
108
See CHURCH, supra note 87, § 2 (quoting THOMSON, supra note 87, at 83).
109
HALLIDAY, supra note 32, at 145.
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brought in Answer by due Process of the Law.”110 Later commentators, beginning with Sir Edward Coke, focused on the words “due process” as fair and judicial process.111 Habeas corpus was one method
by which justices could review custody and prior process.112 Coke,
who famously connected due process to habeas corpus, wrote: “[I]f a
man be taken, or committed to prison contra legem terrae, against the
law of the land, what remedy hath the party grieved? . . . He may have
an habeas corpus . . . .”113 Commentators following Coke celebrated
habeas corpus and the due process concept as a common law source
for individual rights and liberty.114 Coke described how both due process and habeas corpus enabled judges to ensure against arbitrary and
unlawful imprisonment. Habeas provided, however, a broader power
to supervise jailers. Habeas corpus did not merely assure compliance
with pretrial due process, but empowered the judge to scrutinize the
factual and legal authorization of the detention.115
3. The Suspension Clause
The Suspension Clause stands alone as the only common law writ
mentioned in the Constitution. Article I, Section 9 provides: “The
110
Liberty of Subject, 1354, 28 Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.), reprinted in 1 THE STATUTES OF THE
REALM 345 (1810); see Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120
YALE L.J. 408, 428 (2010).
111
Keith Jurow, Untimely Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the Origins of Due Process of Law,
19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 265, 266 (1975) (noting the tendency of scholars to focus on the
words “due process of law” at the expense of the remainder of the 1354 statute). Sir Edward Coke famously equated “due proces of law” with “law of the land,” as the “true sense
and exposition” of the phrase. EDWARDO COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1809) (1642). Coke’s conflation of
law of the land with due process has been much criticized. See, e.g., MEADOR, supra note 4,
at 22 (“[T]he final welding together of [habeas corpus and due process] was probably
effected by Coke’s monumental Institutes on the Law of England, though they have been
heavily criticized as to quality of scholarship.”); Halliday & White, supra note 32, at 640
(pointing out “law of the land” also referred in significant part to property law, literally law
concerned with land, and more generally with franchises over subjects); Jurow, supra, at
271 (“It would have been impossible to subsume all that was considered to be ‘the law of
the land’ in a single statute.”). Coke may have simply been describing judicial process, not
broader questions of individual rights we now associate with “due process.” See Jurow,
supra, at 272, 277. After all, “the word ‘process’ itself meant writs,” including those summoning parties to appear in court. Id. at 272.
112
Coke turned from calling “law of the land” as “due proces [sic] of the common law”
to habeas, noting that orders for arrest must be based on “just cause of suspicion” to “be
determined by the justices . . . upon a habeas corpus.” COKE, supra note 111, at 50, 52.
113
Id. at 54.
114
As William Blackstone wrote, “Of great importance to the public is the preservation
of this personal liberty . . . .” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *131. Blackstone also
explained that habeas dealt with the “personal liberty of the subject.” Id. Elsewhere, Blackstone explained that habeas did so by permitting “the court upon an habeas corpus” to
examine the validity of a confinement “and according to the circumstances of the case may
discharge, admit to bail, or remand the prisoner.” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*133.
115
See supra notes 86–92 and accompanying text.
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Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it.”116 The Clause refers to preserving an existing writ, and it was not
discussed extensively at the Constitutional Convention.117 Halliday
and White explain that “the Suspension Clause carried the writ of
habeas corpus out of English practice and into American law with little additional jurisprudential baggage.”118
In the United States, as in England, the common law writ continued to operate as before at the state level, but statutes regulated federal habeas practice. In Ex parte Bollman, the Supreme Court declared
that the power to issue writs of habeas corpus must be given by “written law,” but noted that the first Congress, feeling the “obligation” to
give “life and activity” to “this great constitutional privilege,”119 enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, which empowered all federal judges to
grant the writ.120 The Act provided that state prisoners could pursue
writ-of-error review of state supreme court decisions in the U.S. Supreme Court but could not obtain habeas review of “cause of commitment” in federal courts.121 The Ex parte Bollman Court noted that state
courts are “the creatures of a distinct government” and therefore state
prisoners lacked statutory means to pursue habeas corpus in federal
courts.122
In contrast, the Act provided for factual and legal review of detention of federal prisoners. For example, in 1807, following the decision
in Ex parte Bollman, the Court held five days of hearings to “fully examine[ ]” the evidence before granting the writ.123 Jared Goldstein
116

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
Delegates at the Philadelphia Convention disagreed about what circumstances
should permit a suspension of the writ, whether suspension should be limited to a specific
amount of time, or whether suspension should be permitted at all. See DUKER, supra note
21, at 128–31 (“[T]he absence of the affirmative clause was insignificant. . . . Every state
. . . secured the writ. The chief concern . . . was over the power to suspend.” (footnotes
omitted)); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 438 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
118
Halliday & White, supra note 32, at 583.
119
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807).
120
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82; Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at
83–84, 101.
121
§ 14, 1 Stat. at 81–82 (limiting habeas review to prisoners held under the authority
of the United States); § 25, 1 Stat. 85–87 (providing appellate writ-of-error review in the
U.S. Supreme Court of final judgments and decrees of state high courts where, inter alia, a
state statute is challenged as “repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States”); 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2.4[d][i] (6th ed. 2011).
122
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 97.
123
Id. at 125, 136. Chief Justice Marshall did the same, sitting in a circuit case involving an enemy alien detainee. See Gerald L. Neuman & Charles F. Hobson, John Marshall
and the Enemy Alien: A Case Missing from the Canon, 9 GREEN BAG (n.s.) 39, 42–43 (2005).
State judges conducted similar factual review of detentions. See Halliday & White, supra
117
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reviewed federal habeas decisions following the Act through 1867,
finding that a wide variety of petitions were “framed as challenges to
the custodian’s detention authority, not as violations of individual
rights,” including “fact-based challenges.”124
The detention versus postconviction distinction—broad factual
and legal review of federal detention but more limited review of state
and federal criminal convictions—divides habeas corpus jurisprudence to this day, although courts have dramatically expanded federal
habeas corpus for both state and federal convicts. The current federal
statute governing the writ of habeas corpus generally,
28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2248, retains language from the First Judiciary Act
and provides that a petitioner in federal custody need not lay out a
legal claim, but “shall allege the facts concerning the applicant’s commitment or detention, the name of the person who has custody over
him and by virtue of what claim or authority, if known.”125 Under 28
U.S.C. § 2243, a judge may issue the writ, order a return, and then
“determine the facts” to evaluate “the true cause of the detention”
specified in the return.126 Discovery is available during habeas proceedings as well as evidentiary hearings, both of which remain largely
unchanged since common law habeas.127
Twentieth-century federal prisoner petition rulings follow the
same process. Immigration habeas decisions in particular demonstrate this point, because habeas corpus can play a distinctive role
where noncitizens may lack due process rights to any additional immigration procedure. For example, in Ludecke v. Watkins, the Court upheld discretionary deportation authority under the Alien Enemy Act
of 1798 without additional procedures, but noted that judicial review
remained available to examine “the construction and validity of the
statute” and “whether the person restrained is in fact an alien
enemy.”128
Habeas corpus has other, more varied applications, and in some
respects the practice has dramatically changed—chiefly outside the
executive detention context. Most significantly, federal habeas statutes have changed with respect to state conviction review. In this connote 32, at 709–12 (describing and interpreting a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case reviewing custody of enemy aliens detained in War of 1812).
124
Goldstein, supra note 40, at 1195.
125
28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2006).
126
Id. § 2243. Those statutory procedures have been modified only slightly since the
First Judiciary Act.
127
RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 6(a)
(2010) (permitting discovery “for good cause”).
128
335 U.S. 160, 171 & n.17 (1948). To be sure, such habeas rulings did not adopt any
particular standard of proof. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (noting that seventeenth century English courts also avoided adopting a uniform standard of proof); infra
Part III.A (discussing the post-Boumediene question of standard of proof).
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text judges and scholars have debated whether habeas corpus
necessarily requires any particular level of judicial review.129 Much of
the language describing habeas as a “vehicle” for remedying violations
of constitutional rights refers to the context of postconviction review.
Unlike federal detainees, federal convicts seeking postconviction review must pursue relief under a separate statute, requiring assertion of
a right to be released under the constitution or federal law and imposing procedural restrictions on such litigation.130 Similarly, state prisoners generally must claim that they are “in custody in violation” of
the constitution or federal law.131 In state prisoner petitions, judges
must rule on separate federal claims.132 Federal review of state convictions is deferential; judges grant hearings in limited circumstances.133
Federal judges defer to legal rulings by state judges,134 including
based on the stringent requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).135 After all, unlike executive detainees, federal and state convicts received prior judicial process—a trial,
an appeal, and perhaps state habeas. When judges apply exceptions
129
See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 509–11 (1963) (“Why is it . . . that we go so far to allow relitigation of
constitutional questions . . . and yet do not allow any relitigation of the fundamental question of the factual guilt or innocence of the accused?”). Those debates relate to postconviction habeas, not review of federal detention in which there has been no judgment
receiving “finality.” A related debate about scope of early twentieth century postconviction
habeas opinions concerns the relationship between habeas and due process. The Court
described early decisions denying habeas as follows: “Absent an alleged jurisdictional defect, ‘habeas corpus would not lie for a [state] prisoner . . . if he had been given an adequate opportunity to obtain full and fair consideration of his federal claim in the state
courts.’” Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 285 (1992) (alterations in original) (quoting Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 459–60 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). That view has been criticized
as conflating the scope of habeas corpus with that of the Due Process Clause. Thus, Justice
O’Connor explained, “[W]hen the Court stated that a state prisoner who had been afforded a full and fair hearing could not obtain a writ of habeas corpus, the Court was
propounding a rule of constitutional law, not a threshold requirement of habeas corpus.”
Id. at 298 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 575, 597–601 (1993) (describing more complex history in which habeas review was
more limited than scope of available constitutional rights, but courts did not conduct
purely “jurisdictional” review).
130
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006).
131
Id. § 2241.
132
For statutory requirements referring to claims, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D)
(timely presentation of claims based on new evidence); id. § 2254(d) (standard of review
for “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court”); see also Rose v. Lundy,
455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982) (requiring “total exhaustion” of each federal claim).
133
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), (e).
134
See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (holding that “new constitutional
rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable” to petitioners with cases pending postconviction review at the time a new rule is announced).
135
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28 and 42
U.S.C.); see Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996) (holding that AEDPA restrictions on
successive habeas petitions do not amount to an unconstitutional suspension of the writ).
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to those restrictions, they typically do so because important new evidence surfaces that no judge has yet examined.136
Executive detention challenges are different. In immigration
habeas, across a wide range of contexts in which noncitizens seek to
challenge decisions to detain or remove them from the United States,
Congress has enacted statutes that preserve de novo review of questions of law.137 However, Congress has provided for deferential review
of questions of fact where those questions are committed to administrative discretion or where the case involves a noncitizen with a prior
criminal conviction.138 Congress has provided for broader fact review
for asylum cases139 and de novo fact review where a person’s citizenship is at issue.140 The Supreme Court has also insisted on careful
judicial review of indefinite or lengthy detention pending removal.141
As I develop in Part IV, these complex distinctions in immigration law
remain in many respects highly imperfect products of legislative compromises. However, in part due to both the Supreme Court’s interventions and judicial and legislative concern with avoiding Suspension
Clause problems, habeas corpus plays a comparatively greater role
precisely where the detention lacks prior judicial process or extensive
due process protections.
4. The Due Process Clause
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, mirrored in
the Fourteenth Amendment, states, “No person shall be . . . deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”142 The
Clause “imposes procedural limitations on a State’s power to take
away protected entitlements.”143 Justice Scalia has called the Fifth
Amendment an “affirmation of Magna Charta according to Coke,”144
and early decisions, like the Court’s 1856 decision in Murray’s Lessee v.
Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., invoked Magna Carta to describe
process due by looking to “settled usages and modes of proceeding” at
common law.145 In 1884, in Hurtado v. California, the Court approved
136

See infra note 365 and accompanying text.
See infra note 473 and accompanying text.
138
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (b)(4)(B) (2006); infra Part IV.A.
139
See, e.g., Xi An He v. Holder, 467 F. App’x 558, 559 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We review for
substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings . . . .”); Ndrecaj v. Holder, 445 F. App’x
428, 430 (2d Cir. 2011) (“We review the factual findings of the [Board of Immigration
Appeals] and [Immigration Judge] for substantial evidence.” (quoting Islam v. Gonzales,
469 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 2006))).
140
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B).
141
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699–702 (2001).
142
U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
143
Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 67 (2009).
144
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 29, 30 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
145
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,
276–77 (1856).
137
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of the argument that due process is the “equivalent” of the “law of the
land” in Magna Carta.146 Into the twentieth century, petitioners often
filed common law actions, such as trespass, that did not assert due
process rights.147 However, in response, officials could raise a defense
that a statute authorized their acts.148 A court might find the statute
unconstitutional and the acts not immunized, citing the Due Process
Clause. As in traditional habeas litigation, the constitutional issue
arose through anticipation of a defense.
As common law pleading forms eroded, habeas and civil litigation drifted apart. While habeas practice remained largely the same
in the federal executive detention context, in civil cases courts began
to require the civil rights petitioner to name a constitutional or statutory source for relief.149 This reflected a slow-to-emerge and more
positivist view of rights.150 The Court now emphasizes that the Due
Process Clause requires a court to ask if a particular right is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice.”151 The
focus is on the “essential principle . . . that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property ‘be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case.’”152 Additionally, the Court
adapted hearing and notice concepts into standards that apply to the
full spectrum of state action.
The result is not one but many due process tests regulating disparate areas where government action touches on life, liberty and property interests, including administrative procedure, criminal
investigations and procedure, civil procedure, jurisdiction, and judicial remedies.153 In areas of civil procedure, most notably personal
jurisdiction but also notice requirements, the Court has cited to realities of modern society, as well as costs, and has broken with traditional
forms of process.154 In other areas, including substantive due process,
146

110 U.S. 516, 521 (1884).
Michael G. Collins, “Economic Rights,” Implied Constitutional Actions, and the Scope of
Section 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1510–33 (1989).
148
See id.
149
See Woolhandler, supra note 129, at 623–25 (describing the “gradual replacement
of common law pleading with pleading that identified a positive source of law”).
150
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 381 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing against a
“natural law” notion of due process, guided by conceptions of “fundamental fairness”);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 100–01 (1908) (rejecting the idea that common law
procedures are “fastened upon the American jurisprudence like a straight-jacket”).
151
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034 (2010) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
152
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quoting Mullane v.
Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).
153
Id.
154
Compare Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing modern
notions of process justifying jurisdiction based on “certain minimum contacts” rather than
requiring physical presence), with Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878) (“[I]t is . . . an
147
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the Court has relied on newly formed consensus.155 In a range of
areas affected by activities of administrative agencies, typically involving new property interests in government benefits, the Court applied
the Mathews v. Eldridge three-part test, weighing the private interest
affected, the government interest in not providing added safeguards,
and the risk of error absent the procedures.156
Due process jurisprudence retains some of the character of its
common law origins. The Court has emphasized that the “most elemental” of liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause is “the
interest in being free from physical detention by one’s own government.”157 Similarly, “[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been
at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”158 In
areas closely impacting personal liberty, the Court rejects application
of the Mathews test, noting that “fundamental fairness” has been the
standard used “[i]n the field of criminal law,” in part because Bill of
Rights provisions govern criminal procedure directly.159 The Court
has, however, applied Mathews in a few contexts relating to deprivations of liberty, including procedures for pretrial detention160 and involuntary civil commitment.161 In Ake v. Oklahoma, the Court invoked
the Mathews test regarding trial access to experts necessary for an effective defense, but it also cited concerns of fundamental fairness.162
On the whole, due process regulation of criminal procedure has become far more substantial and detailed than anything found at common law, covering the entire criminal process from investigations and
trials to appeals and postconviction.163
elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory
. . . .”).
155
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (noting that at the time of the
Court’s opinion the right to same-sex intimacy was “accepted as an integral part of human
freedom in many other countries” and only thirteen states had antisodomy statutes on the
books); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 139–40 (1973) (“In the past several years, however, a
trend toward liberalization of abortion statutes has resulted in adoption, by about onethird of the States, of less stringent laws . . . .”).
156
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
157
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citing Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
158
Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982)).
159
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992).
160
See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746, 750–51 (1987).
161
See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 330–31 (1993); Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113,
127–28 (1990); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
162
470 U.S. 68, 76–82 (1985).
163
See Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedures: The Supreme
Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 310–12 (2001) (describing
the “law of the land” as understood by Coke as requiring that the monarchy, as well as the
courts, “to adhere to legal regularity, basing their decisions upon the common law, custom,
or statute, and not personal whim”).
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The sheer breadth of modern due process can distract from areas
in which habeas is broader than due process. The Supreme Court has
emphasized only in narrowly defined substantive due process decisions that some deprivations of liberty may be barred “regardless of
the fairness of the procedures used to implement them,”164 although
overlap is greater, as I discuss in Part IV, in decisions regarding limitations on indefinite civil detention. The focus of a judge using habeas
process on the legal and factual authorization for a detention, apart
from adequacy of procedure, is quite different from that of a judge
relying on modern due process jurisprudence. Due process tests proceed differently by balancing cost, tradition, dignitary interests, liberty
interests, federalism, and policy concerns. Indeed, “due process doctrine has developed a strikingly managerial aspect,” promoting
“schemes and incentives adequate to keep government, overall and on
average, tolerably within the bounds of law.”165 In general terms this
description of due process has something in common with habeas
corpus, but the complex contours of evolving modern aspects of due
process jurisprudence, with its various tests adapted to different contexts, share little in common with the core, persistent purpose of
habeas corpus: reviewing the basis for detention.
C. A Writ and a Right
In 1963 in Fay v. Noia, Justice William Brennan wrote: “Although
in form the Great Writ is simply a mode of procedure, its history is
inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty,” adding, “[v]indication of due process is precisely its historic office.”166 In broad strokes, that passage captures how due
process and habeas law have long dealt with matters of personal liberty. While majestic, the passage is imprecise. Both due process and
habeas corpus are concerned with persons in custody, but in very different ways.167 Depending on the context, habeas corpus or due process may have different reach.
Not all habeas petitions are grounded in a theory based on a constitutional or federal right. As described, federal prisoners—but not
state prisoners—may seek habeas review if “in custody under or by
164
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (noting also that the
Court has been “reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process”); Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
165
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 311 (1993).
166
372 U.S. 391, 401–02 (1963).
167
See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (2006) (requiring generally that the writ “shall not extend”
unless the applicant is “in custody”); Russell v. City of Pierre, 530 F.2d 791, 792 (8th Cir.
1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976) (“The writ of habeas corpus is available only to one who is ‘in custody.’” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c))).
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color of the authority of the United States.”168 But, as the Court held
in INS v. St. Cyr, habeas also permits review of statutory entitlements.169 Why is that? Legal questions may arise in habeas in ways
they could not in a due process challenge. A judge may grant habeas
if the statute authorizing the detention is legally invalid. This situation arises when the statute is unconstitutional, conflicts with other
law, or when it is valid but does not authorize the type of detention at
issue. Factually, the individual may not be of the type who may be
detained under the applicable statute. In contrast, due process jurisprudence, aside from substantive due process rulings, focuses on the
general adequacy of process used when deciding to detain a person,
not on the substantive authorization for the individual detention.
While scholarship has focused on the effect of a suspension or a
statute stripping federal courts of habeas jurisdiction, some suggest
that lack of a due process right cuts off access to habeas corpus.170
Habeas process may be provided, however, even in cases without a due
process violation. As noted, the Court directly addressed this scenario
in immigration rulings involving noncitizens at the border who have
limited due process rights. The Court has repeated that habeas
corpus nevertheless permits an inquiry into the detention’s authorization.171 In that setting, as in others, habeas corpus may provide remedies where a due process claim would not.
Habeas corpus may prove narrower than due process in other
contexts, particularly for state convicts. Convicts cannot raise some
due process claims challenging their state trial convictions in a habeas
168

28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1).
See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001) (“[T]he issuance of the
writ . . . encompassed detentions based on . . . the erroneous application or interpretation
of statutes. It was used to command the discharge of seamen who had a statutory exemption from impressment into the British Navy, to emancipate slaves, and to obtain the freedom of apprentices and asylum inmates.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Gerald L. Neuman,
Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1963, 1991
(2000) (discussing a circuit split over whether habeas review encompasses statutorily derived discretionary procedures). Procedural due process also embraces discretionary entitlements, as in leading cases such as Mathews v. Eldridge, a case about disability benefits.
424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (noting, however, that the Secretary had conceded that the statutory benefit created a “property” interest).
170
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
171
See, e.g., Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 234–35 (1953) (upholding habeas corpus
availability, although the statute at issue barred judicial review of a final deportation order); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (examining the
statutory and constitutional authorization for alien exclusion despite the fact that “an alien
who seeks admission to this country may not do so under any claim of right”); Ludecke v.
Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 171 & n.17 (1948) (upholding deportation without a hearing under
the Alien Enemy Act and rejecting the notion that “some emanation of the Bill of Rights”
would render this invalid, but also stating that judicial review remained as to “whether the
person restrained is in fact an alien enemy”); United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621,
626–32 (1888) (holding that the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 did not affect jurisdiction
of federal courts to hear habeas petitions). I explore immigration habeas in Part III.A.
169
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petition, especially where some other vehicle is more appropriate.172
Since states are not constitutionally obligated to provide postconviction procedures,173 “when a State chooses to offer help to those seeking relief from convictions,” due process does not “dictate[ ] the exact
form such assistance must assume.”174 On the other hand, due process does help to protect rights to “adequate and effective” access to
courts at trial, appeal, and postconviction.175
The Suspension Clause speaks of preserving a common law privilege. Does the Suspension Clause also preserve access to certain due
process rights—or other procedural or substantive rights? Some
claim that regardless of their origins, the Framers meant to join the
concepts of due process and habeas corpus together.176 Due process
jurisprudence changed dramatically over time. Could those changes
affect the scope of habeas corpus? Could vast changes in the role of
federal courts, statutes regulating habeas, and notions of executive
power also affect habeas? At times, as noted, the Court assumed that
at a minimum “the Suspension Clause protects only the writ as it existed in 1789.”177 In other cases, the Court assumed the writ might
expand.178
Few expected that the Court would try to fix the affirmative
meaning of the Suspension Clause, but ultimately it did just that in its
post-9/11 decisions. To careful observers of the Court’s decisions regarding habeas corpus and noncitizens in the immigration context,
the result should have been no surprise. Even without recognized due
process rights, habeas corpus plays an important role.

172
See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994) (determining that a criminally
convicted person cannot bring a civil suit challenging the conviction (e.g., for malicious
prosecution) until the conviction is overturned by reversal on appeal or by executive
pardon).
173
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556 (1987) (“[I]t is clear that the State need
not provide any appeal at all.” (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611 (1974))).
174
Id. at 559.
175
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666 (1983) (“Whether analyzed in terms of equal
protection or due process, the issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956); see also
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985) (recognizing a defendant’s due process right to
have “the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his
liberty is at stake”).
176
See supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text.
177
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 304 (2001). Daniel Meltzer has suggested that 1789 is
not the relevant year; 1789 is the year of the First Judiciary Act, not the Constitutional
Convention (1787) or ratification of the Constitution (1788). Meltzer, supra note 30, at 15
n.62.
178
See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663–64 (1996) (“But we assume, for purposes of decision here, that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution refers to the writ as
it exists today, rather than as it existed in 1789.”).
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II
FROM HAMDI

TO

BOUMEDIENE

The Supreme Court in Boumediene clarified that, standing alone,
the Suspension Clause ensures access to certain procedures: “Even
when the procedures authorizing detention are structurally sound,
the Suspension Clause remains applicable and the writ relevant.”179
The Court developed the substantive content of the process habeas
provides. This is not to say that process can be substantive, but rather
that process addresses the underlying question of whether the detention is authorized and is freestanding and distinct. Nevertheless, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion drew from due process
principles to explain what process the Suspension Clause guarantees.180 This triggered a vigorous debate with Chief Justice Roberts in
dissent about the relationship between habeas corpus and due process.181 The Court’s Hamdi ruling helps to explain how the Court
reached its Boumediene result, clarifying that habeas corpus alone ensures access to habeas process, which entails an independent review by
a federal judge to examine the legal and factual authorization for a
detention. This view of the Suspension Clause anchors the central
role for habeas corpus in regulating detentions.
A. Hamdi: Due Process and Habeas Process
1. The Mathews Test
The Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld ultimately relied on the Mathews v. Eldridge due process test, merely
touching on sources grounded in habeas corpus. This choice set the
stage for debates about the relationship between habeas and due
process.
Yaser Esam Hamdi was captured by Northern Alliance allies in
Afghanistan, who eventually turned him over to the U.S. military.182
After some unspecified screening, including interrogations, the U.S.
military brought him to Guantánamo Bay.183 The Executive had previously designated Guantánamo Bay as a center for indefinite detention of “enemy combatants,” who did not receive Prisoner of War
status and were interrogated without access to counsel.184 The military concluded that Hamdi was an “enemy combatant,” to be detained
179

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008).
See infra Part II.B.3.
181
See infra Part II.C.
182
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (plurality opinion).
183
Id.
184
See David Golove, United States: The Bush Administration’s “War on Terrorism” in the
Supreme Court, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 128, 128–29 (2005).
180
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indefinitely “without formal charges or proceedings.”185 When the
Executive determined that Hamdi was a U.S. citizen, the military
transferred him to a naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia, perhaps because
the government understood that Hamdi’s citizenship might lead to a
judicial opinion finding habeas jurisdiction over a Guantánamo
detainee.186
When Hamdi filed a habeas petition, the district court appointed
a federal defender and ordered that counsel be given access to
Hamdi, an order that the government appealed.187 Hamdi challenged his detention, relying on the Due Process Clause among his
claims.188 When pressed, the government submitted a declaration by
a defense department official “familiar” with the case, stating that the
government had deemed Hamdi an enemy combatant following review by “U.S. military screening team[s].”189 Although the government’s “sole evidentiary support” was hearsay, it maintained that the
judge was obligated to dismiss the petition so long as the government
could offer “some evidence” that Hamdi was an enemy combatant.190
The district court rejected that position, calling it “little more than the
government’s ‘say-so,’” but the Fourth Circuit reversed.191
The Court, in a plurality opinion authored by Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, ultimately held that the case justified more searching review. The Hamdi plurality relied on due process precedent, stating:
“The ordinary mechanism that we use for balancing such serious competing interests, and for determining the procedures that are necessary to ensure that a citizen is not “deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law” . . . is the test that we articulated
in Mathews v. Eldridge . . . .”192
The Mathews cost-benefit balancing test has its merits, including
its potential to lend transparency to interest balancing. It is not an
outlier approach either. As Stephen Gardbaum put it, “We all live in
the age of constitutional balancing.”193 But the Court’s claim that the
Mathews test was the “ordinary” due process “mechanism” may have
been more controversial. Scholars have long argued that Mathews
185

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510, 513.
Id.
187
Id. at 512.
188
See id. at 511; see also 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2006) (“No citizen shall be imprisoned or
otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”).
189
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 512–13 (alteration in original).
190
See id. at 512, 527.
191
See id. at 513–14.
192
Id. at 528–29 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
193
Stephen Gardbaum, A Democratic Defense of Constitutional Balancing, 4 LAW & ETHICS
HUM. RTS. 78, 79 (2010). But see Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27
GA. L. REV. 415, 416 (1993) (criticizing from a philosophical angle the asserted “interconnectedness of rights with interests, powers, and consequences”).
186
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should be (and largely has been) confined to evaluating administrative hearings.194 The Mathews analysis has been variously criticized for
its flexibility, rigidity, focus on quantifying costs, consequentialism,
failure to account for other values—particularly dignitary values—and
for courts’ failure to quantify error rates or other interests.195 The
author of the Hamdi plurality, Justice O’Connor, previously supported
applying Mathews in criminal cases.196 The Mathews test is useful, as
Justice O’Connor noted, in the administrative context because there
is “no historical practice to consider.”197 In Hamdi, Justice O’Connor
presumably viewed enemy combatant detention as similarly lacking
sufficient guidance from historical practice.
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurring,
did not agree with the plurality’s due process approach.198 The dissenters, however, more directly confronted the plurality’s due process
analysis. Justice Scalia mocked how the plurality “claims authority to
engage in this sort of ‘judicious balancing’ from Mathews v. Eldridge, a
case involving . . . the withdrawal of disability benefits!”199 Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, noting that the parties never relied on Mathews, and such analysis, if appropriate, was incorrect: “I do not think
that the Federal Government’s war powers can be balanced away by
this Court.”200
How does one weigh incommensurate and immeasurable interests, individual and national? Balancing interests in a national security detention case would not be easy. The plurality acknowledged that
“substantial interests lie on both sides of the scale in this case.”201 The
194
See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV.
1044, 1137–38 (1984).
195
See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L.
REV. 28, 53–54 (1976); Rubin, supra note 194, at 1046; Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due
Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
111, 155 (1978); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 252–57
(2004).
196
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
197
Id. at 453–54.
198
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 553–54 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the suggestion that government should benefit from an evidentiary presumption
placing the burden on the detainee).
199
Id. at 575–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Scholars have criticized the Hamdi Court’s use of the Mathews analysis. See, e.g., Goldstein,
supra note 40, at 1206 (noting “the absence of a reliable scale upon which to measure and
balance the detainees’ liberty interests against the government’s national-security interests”); Tung Yin, Procedural Due Process to Determine “Enemy Combatant” Status in the War on
Terrorism, 73 TENN. L. REV. 351, 355, 398–400 (2006) (noting that “the interests on both
sides can be described with apocalyptic intensity” and that the test is “likely to succumb to a
result-oriented malleability”). I do not view the Mathews test as more or less malleable than
alternatives; it may be more transparent.
200
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 579, 594 & n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
201
Id. at 529 (plurality opinion).
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private interest was “the most elemental of liberty interests—the interest in being free from physical detention by one’s own government.”202 Meanwhile, the government asserted its interest in assuring
that the enemy does not “return to battle against the United
States.”203 The Hamdi plurality did not assign numbers or weights, but
turned to the outcome: “[A] citizen-detainee . . . must receive notice
of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.”204 The plurality left the particulars open. Hamdi would
continue to receive a lawyer.205 A court might admit hearsay evidence
and there might be “a presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence.”206 In dicta, the plurality suggested that due process need not
require judicial process and that the decision maker need not be an
Article III judge.207 Could the government comply with due process
but in doing so cut off habeas corpus review entirely?
2. Habeas Corpus Process
Perhaps most surprisingly, the Hamdi plurality did not heavily rely
on the habeas precedent described in Part I regarding executive detentions. Since Hamdi was a U.S. citizen, the Court largely avoided
discussing cases that extend habeas to noncitizens lacking due process
protection. In several crucial passages, however, the plurality did suggest that due process balancing did not end its analysis: “[A] court
that receives a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from an alleged
enemy combatant must itself ensure that the minimum requirements
of due process are achieved.”208 Habeas provides process both to assess the adequacy of prior process and, more fundamentally, to examine the authorization for a detention. While the Mathews test may
provide guidance where there is “no historical practice to consider,”209 habeas corpus involves a rich historical practice, which the
Hamdi plurality drew on. The plurality noted that “[a]bsent suspension of the writ by Congress, a citizen detained as an enemy combatant is entitled to this process.”210 Specifically, that process provided
the chance to challenge “the factual basis” for the detention.211 It is
not due process alone but rather “the Great Writ of habeas corpus
202

Id. (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
Id. at 531.
204
Id. at 533.
205
Id. at 539.
206
Id. at 533–34.
207
Id. at 538 (“There remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated
could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal.”).
208
Id.
209
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 453–54 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
210
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537.
211
Id.
203
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[which] allows the Judicial Branch to play a necessary role . . . as an
important judicial check on the Executive’s discretion in the realm of
detentions.”212
The importance of this part of the plurality ruling remains underappreciated, perhaps because of its lack of clarity.213 The plurality indicated that the Suspension Clause ensured the availability of habeas
corpus, years before the Boumediene Court decided the question. The
plurality cited to 42 U.S.C. § 2241 and various companion provisions,214 which “provide at least a skeletal outline of the procedures to
be afforded a petitioner in federal habeas review,” including the ability to take “evidence in habeas proceedings by deposition, affidavit, or
interrogatories.”215 The plurality concluded that “Congress envisioned that habeas petitioners would have some opportunity to present and rebut facts and that courts in cases like this retain some
ability to vary the ways in which they do so as mandated by due process.”216 The plurality relied not only on federal habeas statutes but
also on the Suspension Clause. The plurality noted that absent a suspension, “[a]t all other times, [habeas corpus] has remained a critical
check on the Executive, ensuring that it does not detain individuals
except in accordance with law.”217 The Hamdi plurality relied on the
“skeletal outline” of habeas process set out in statutes218 and, crucially,
judicial power grounded in the Suspension Clause and independent
of the adequacy of prior process.
3. A Thicker Due Process?
Two dissenters advanced a simpler view of the relationship between the Suspension Clause and the Due Process Clause. Justice
Scalia, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, viewed the two clauses as
intimately connected. Justice Scalia called habeas corpus “the instrument by which due process could be insisted upon by a citizen illegally
imprisoned.”219 But Justice Scalia would not engage in a balancing of
interests to decide what process was due.220 Habeas corpus would sim212

Id. at 536.
Jonathan Hafetz is one commentator who focuses on this language and not exclusively on Hamdi’s due process language. Jonathan Hafetz, Habeas Corpus, Judicial Review,
and Limits on Secrecy in Detentions at Guantánamo, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 127,
157–58 (2006) (“[C]ourts have looked to habeas corpus as an independent source of procedural protections . . . .”).
214
42 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2243, 2246 (2006).
215
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525.
216
Id. at 526.
217
Id. at 525.
218
Id.
219
Id. at 555–56 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220
See supra note 208.
213
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ply require release.221 He pointed out that “[t]he role of habeas
corpus is to determine the legality of executive detention, not to supply the omitted process necessary to make it legal.”222 Habeas corpus
does supply process—to review authorization of a detention. That review does not absolve a court of the responsibility to release a person
whose detention is unauthorized. Justice Scalia rejected importing
the “questionable” Mathews analysis, which “has no place where the
Constitution and the common law already supply an answer.”223
Habeas corpus required a due process “right of trial” before a competent tribunal, since detention without a trial has traditionally been
only narrowly permitted.224
The dispute between the majority and dissent relates to the connection between habeas corpus and due process—and also the content of each. The Hamdi plurality did not explain its use of Mathews
balancing, nor the full contours of the process that indefinitely detained citizens would receive. The Boumediene Court would later more
fully address habeas process and its contours.
B. Boumediene and Due Process
Four years after Hamdi, the Court finally confronted whether
habeas corpus can supply rights where due process might not. In doing so, the Court revisited questions it had engaged with long before
in immigration habeas rulings, and it reiterated, over vigorous dissents, that habeas corpus can supply process where due process does
not.
After the Court’s rulings in Hamdi and Rasul v. Bush,225 finding
that habeas jurisdiction was available at Guantánamo Bay, the government released Yaser Hamdi,226 and, within weeks, created a new process to evaluate the status of Guantánamo Bay detainees.227 The
Deputy Secretary of Defense established Combatant Status Review
221
Trevor Morrison explored the implications of Justice Scalia’s views, which he helpfully terms “suspension as authorization.” Trevor W. Morrison, Hamdi’s Habeas Puzzle: Suspension as Authorization?, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 424 (2006).
222
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 576 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
223
Id.
224
See id. at 556 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1783, at 661 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833));
Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, supra note 21, at 384 n.280 (“The Court correctly
held that due process governed the inquiry; its conclusion, by contrast, that all due process
promised the citizen-detainee was a hearing on his status was troubling.”).
225
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
226
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of Mark Corallo, Dir. of Pub. Affairs,
Regarding Yaser Hamdi (Sept. 22, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2004/September/04_opa_640.htm.
227
See Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of
the Navy 1–4 (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/jul2004/
d20040707review.pdf.
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Tribunals (CSRTs) to assess whether each Guantánamo detainee was
an enemy combatant in order to “comply with the due process requirements identified by the plurality in Hamdi.”228 CSRTs did not
provide lawyers.229 CSRTs did, however, provide an assigned Personal
Representative who could assist and explain the process, but was not
an advocate.230 The deciding tribunal consisted of three military officers.231 The detainee could present evidence, but the tribunal operated under the rebuttable presumption that government evidence was
“reliable and accurate.”232 Detainees who denied any affiliation with
al-Qaeda promptly challenged the hearings as inadequate. One district judge took the view that aliens detained outside the United States
lacked rights under the Due Process Clause and dismissed the petitions.233 A second judge disagreed and concluded the detainees had
due process rights.234 Both judges relied on the Due Process Clause.
Meanwhile, Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005 (DTA), which significantly restricted judicial review of CSRT determinations and military trials of enemy combatants, permitting only
review of narrow issues in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.235 The
Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ruled that the DTA did not apply retroactively, rendering it ineffective, as the government had ceased adding
to the Guantánamo Bay detainee population by 2005.236 In response,
Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), which
provided that the DTA applied retroactively, restricting habeas review
228

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 734 (2008).
See Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, supra note 227, at 1.
230
See id.
231
Id.
232
Mark Denbeaux & Joshua W. Denbeaux, No-Hearing Hearings—CSRT: The Modern
Habeas Corpus? 5 (Seton Hall Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 951245, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=951245#%23 (examining how
CSRTs worked in practice); see also Baher Azmy, Rasul v. Bush and the Intra-Territorial Constitution, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 369, 399–400 (2007) (describing the CSRT process);
Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, supra note 227, at 3 (permitting introduction of detainee evidence but with a rebuttable presumption in favor of government evidence).
233
Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 314 (D.D.C. 2005).
234
In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 464 (D.D.C. 2005).
235
Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005, 119 Stat. 2739, 2740–42 (limiting review to the questions of whether the government executed CSRTs in accordance with U.S. law and in accordance with the standards and procedures promulgated by the Secretary of Defense,
“including the requirement that the conclusion of the Tribunal be supported by a preponderance of the evidence and allowing a rebuttable presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence”).
236
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 574–87 (2006); see Aziz Z. Huq, What Good is
Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 401–05 (2010) (“[T]he aggregate detention population
at Guantánamo peaked in 2003 and has been dropping ever since. Anecdotal information
suggests that inflows to the base in fact largely dried up in 2004, after the Supreme Court’s
first interventions in the field.”).
229
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to the D.C. Circuit and limiting review to whether the process complied with CSRT procedures and the Constitution.237
Like the district courts, the D.C. Circuit relied on the Due Process Clause when reviewing habeas petitions. For example, the D.C.
Circuit dismissed the consolidated cases of Lakhdar Boumediene and
five Algerian men who were arrested in Bosnia, detained at Guantánamo, and accused of having links to al-Qaeda and planning to bomb
a U.S. Embassy.238 The court reasoned that the petitioners were held
outside the United States, had no constitutional rights under either
the Suspension Clause or the Due Process Clause, and that regardless,
Congress had stripped federal courts of jurisdiction.239 On appeal,
the Supreme Court relied on the Suspension Clause, not the Due Process Clause, and ultimately concluded that the MCA procedures were
not “an adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus,” and they
“operate[d] as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.”240 This
language, which found for the first time that a statute unconstitutionally suspended the writ, has justifiably been the focus of commentary.
1. Retelling Habeas History
Before turning to the constitutional questions, however, the
Court began with “a brief account of the history and origins of the
writ.”241 Telling and retelling the history of the writ is an ingrained
judicial habit, appearing in decisions ranging from Fay v. Noia, with
the ringing language quoted earlier,242 to McCleskey v. Zant,243 with
varying degrees of detail (and accuracy). The Boumediene Court began
by gingerly connecting Magna Carta and habeas corpus. “Magna
Carta decreed that no man would be imprisoned contrary to the law
of the land . . . [but] prescribed no specific legal process to enforce
[this principle].”244 The Court added that “gradually the writ of
habeas corpus became the means by which the promise of Magna
Carta was fulfilled.”245 The Court cited three times to Paul Halliday’s
work researching King’s Bench records, describing a habeas practice
237
28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006); Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366,
§ 7(b), 120 Stat. 2600, 2636 (providing that the amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) would
“apply to all cases, without exception, pending on or after the date of the enactment”).
238
Del Quentin Wilber, Cases Against Detainees Have Thinned, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2008,
at A2; Andy Worthington, Profiles: Odah and Boumediene, BBC NEWS (Dec. 4, 2007, 5:48 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7120713.stm.
239
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 992–94 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
240
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008).
241
Id. at 739.
242
Supra note 84 and accompanying text.
243
499 U.S. 467, 478–79 (1991).
244
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 740 (citing SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 17
(Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959)).
245
Id. (citing 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 112 (1926)).
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very different from the habeas practice historians and judges often
detail.246 Importantly, and perhaps because of this historical grounding, the Court did not directly link habeas corpus to due process. Instead, the Court more accurately described how habeas corpus
became “part of the foundation of liberty for the King’s subjects,”
even though the writ developed as “common-law courts sought to enforce the King’s prerogative.”247
The Court did not clearly establish whether the Suspension
Clause protects the scope of the writ as it existed at the time it was
drafted or whether the scope of the writ’s protections “ha[s] expanded” since the Founding.248 Instead, the Court focused on the
development of habeas as a source of power and its growth to encompass detentions of aliens—including those abroad—so long as the
jailer could be held accountable as the King’s agent.249 In my view,
this is the proper approach; if habeas corpus is a dynamic judicial institution, as history tells us, we should not select an isolated moment
in time to fix its definition.
2. The Suspension Clause Alone?
The Boumediene Court ostensibly did not rely on the Due Process
Clause to ground its opinion. Instead, the Court noted that “[e]ven if
we were to assume that the CSRTs satisfy due process standards, it
would not end our inquiry.”250 The Court went on to explain that the
Suspension Clause has independent force: “Even when the procedures authorizing detention are structurally sound, the Suspension
Clause remains applicable and the writ relevant.”251 This passage in
the Court’s opinion was remarkable. The opinion received substantial
attention for this first-time holding that the Suspension Clause was
violated and provided a source for judicial review to noncitizen detainees who might not enjoy rights under the Due Process Clause.252 The
opinion has also received deserved attention for its discussion of separation of powers principles.253 The Court noted that “[t]he separa246

Id. at 740, 747, 752 (citing Halliday & White, supra note 32, at 586).
Id. at 740–41.
248
Id. at 746 (noting that “the analysis may begin with precedents as of 1789”).
249
See id. at 751 (“[A] categorical or formal conception of sovereignty does not provide a . . . satisfactory explanation for the general understanding that prevailed. . . . English law did not generally apply in Scotland . . . , but it did apply in Ireland. . . . This
distinction, and not formal notions of sovereignty, may well explain why the writ did not
run to Scotland . . . but would run to Ireland.”).
250
Id. at 785.
251
Id.
252
See supra note 30.
253
Stephen I. Vladeck, Common-Law Habeas and the Separation of Powers, 95 IOWA L. REV.
BULL. 39, 51 (2010). The Hamdi plurality also contains important separation-of-powers
language. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535–36 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he

R

247
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tion-of-powers doctrine, and the history that influenced its design,
therefore must inform the reach and purpose of the Suspension
Clause.”254 Repeatedly, the majority cited to the writ’s historical purpose as a check on arbitrary exercise of executive discretion.255 Taking that language seriously, the Court emphasized that habeas is an
independent judicial process, which does not require assertion of any
underlying due process or constitutional violation. Further, the Suspension Clause draws meaning from its structural role in the Constitution as a check on Congress and the Executive: it is “an indispensable
mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers.”256 What then
does the resulting Suspension Clause process consist in?
Reflecting a view that the meaning of the Suspension Clause is
not fixed in time, the Boumediene majority drew on modern due process sources, while rejecting the view that habeas requires assertion of
underlying due process rights. The Court suggested that the Due Process Clause influenced its analysis in a striking passage:
The idea that the necessary scope of habeas review in part depends upon the rigor of any earlier proceedings accords with our
test for procedural adequacy in the due process context. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (noting that the Due Process Clause requires an assessment of, inter alia, “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of [a liberty interest;] and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”).257

I will return to the Mathews citation. The language stating that process
depends on the “rigor of any earlier proceedings” is not inconsistent
with a focus on habeas process.258 A reviewing judge may have far less
work to do if earlier proceedings have already developed a record.
In the next passage, the Court developed how much process
habeas must provide by turning to rulings regarding “adequate and
effective” substitutes for habeas corpus.259 The Court cited to United
States v. Hayman260 and Swain v. Pressley,261 the two cases in which the
Court inquired “into the adequacy of substitute habeas procedures”
though “the prisoners were detained pursuant to the most rigorous
position that the courts must forgo any examination of the individual case . . . cannot be
mandated by any reasonable view of separation of powers . . . .”).
254
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746.
255
Id. at 744–45, 785, 794, 797; Martin J. Katz, Guantanamo, Boumediene, and Jurisdiction-Stripping: The Imperial President Meets the Imperial Court, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 377,
411–12 (2009); Vladeck, supra note 30, at 2110–11. But see Huq, supra note 236, at 386, 395
(describing “a touch of the ineffable” to the Court’s separation-of-powers discussion).
256
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765.
257
Id. at 781 (alteration in original).
258
See id.
259
See id. at 733.
260
342 U.S. 205 (1952).
261
430 U.S. 372 (1977).
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proceedings imaginable, a full criminal trial.”262 The Court distinguished Hayman and Swain, concluding that the MCA “test[s] the limits of the Suspension Clause in ways that Hayman and Swain did
not.”263 The statutes in Hayman and Swain dealt with postconviction
challenges brought after a trial;264 they did not address executive detention. Both statutes sought to replicate habeas corpus, attempting
to streamline collateral review without limiting access to judicial review. Both statutes also contained safety valves permitting a convict to
file a habeas petition if substitute review was not adequate or effective.265 Neither of the “adequate substitute” cases dealt with cutting
off judicial review of detentions.
While establishing the independent force of the Suspension
Clause, the Boumediene Court also addressed the relationship between
habeas corpus and due process. The Court noted that “[w]here a person is detained by executive order, rather than, say, after being tried
and convicted in a court, the need for collateral review is most pressing.”266 Although the Court also added that the scope of “the underlying detention proceedings” could affect the scope of habeas, the
Court referred to cases involving prior military trials, where one would
expect deference to prior juridical determinations.267
Thus, the Court emphasized that habeas corpus serves a special
role where prior judicial process is lacking, and if prior process is inadequate, habeas corpus will serve a greater role. Citing to the historical purposes of the writ, the Court noted that “common-law habeas
corpus was, above all, an adaptable remedy.”268 The Court stressed
that “the judicial officer must have adequate authority to make a determination in light of the relevant law and facts and to formulate and
issue appropriate orders for relief, including, if necessary, an order
directing the prisoner’s release.”269 In sum, the Suspension Clause
ensures access to process and a remedy. The Hamdi plurality said as
much, but less explicitly.270 The Boumediene Court cited to evidence
that, despite the supposed “black-letter rule” that common law courts
would not examine facts in the jailer’s return, courts did review such
facts, and similarly, U.S. practice “routinely allowed prisoners to intro262

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 785.
Id. at 779.
264
See Swain, 430 U.S. at 385 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (noting that traditionally the
writ was used “to inquire into the cause of commitment not pursuant to judicial process”);
supra note 262 and accompanying text.
265
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006); D.C. CODE § 3-110(g) (2001).
266
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783.
267
Id. at 786 (citing In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), and Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1
(1942)).
268
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779.
269
Id. at 787.
270
See supra notes 215–17 and accompanying text.
263
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duce exculpatory evidence that was either unknown or previously unavailable to the prisoner.”271
The Court emphasized that a detainee must have an opportunity
to develop not just facts but also law, in order to determine whether
the detention is based on “erroneous application or interpretation” of
law.272 By drawing on “common-law habeas corpus” and more recent
habeas sources, the Court outlined an affirmative vision of the Suspension Clause that focuses on the availability of the release remedy, an
examination of questions of law, and fact-finding—in short, whether
through habeas or a substitute the detainee will receive a “traditional
habeas corpus process.”273
3. Influence of Due Process on Habeas
Given this framework, the Court also had to decide whether an
alternative form of judicial process was an “adequate” or “effective”
substitute for habeas. To make this determination, the Court did not
solely rely on sources grounded in a traditional habeas process connected to review of executive detentions. Instead, the Court noted
that “the necessary scope of habeas review in part depends upon the
rigor of any earlier proceedings”274 and cited to Mathews.275 Yet,
habeas is less sensitive to prior process in the detention context, since
“[e]ven when the procedures authorizing detention are structurally
sound, the Suspension Clause remains applicable and the writ relevant.”276 After noting that the Suspension Clause independently
secures “traditional habeas corpus process,” the Court illustrated its
understanding by turning to an analysis mirroring that in Hamdi.
The Court proceeded by “analogizing the Suspension Clause inquiry to the quest for factual accuracy in the procedural due process
balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge.”277 When turning to whether
CSRTs could adequately find facts, the Court stated: “Although we
make no judgment whether the CSRTs, as currently constituted, satisfy due process standards, we agree with petitioners that . . . there is
considerable risk of error in the tribunal’s findings of fact.”278 In the
same breath that the Court disclaimed a due process analysis, the
Court cited to a Mathews-type due process concern with risk of error.
Outside the context of Mathews balancing, error is an important due
process concern; procedural due process rules generally seek to pre271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 780.
Id. at 779 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001)).
Id. at 778–79.
Id. at 781.
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 785.
Neuman, supra note 30, at 554.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 785.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\98-1\CRN102.txt

86

unknown

Seq: 40

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

1-NOV-12

15:10

[Vol. 98:47

vent “mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.”279 The Boumediene Court tied risk of error to inadequacy of
CSRT process.280 The Court added that the private interest was great
“given that the consequence of error may be detention of persons for
the duration of hostilities that may last a generation or more.”281
With this sort of informal balancing, the Court generated a set of
procedures. First, the Court explained that the habeas court “must
have the means to correct errors that occurred during the CSRT proceedings.”282 The court must have “some authority to assess the sufficiency of the Government’s evidence against the detainee,” suggesting
more searching review than required by the Due Process Clause.283
Further, the court must provide access to discovery and “must have
the authority to admit and consider relevant exculpatory evidence
that was not introduced during the earlier proceeding.”284
In that passage, the Court made another remarkable but littlenoticed move, suggesting a due process source unrelated to Mathews,
sounding instead in criminal procedure. Based on Brady v. Maryland
and its progeny, the state must provide material exculpatory evidence
to the defense at a criminal trial.285 In the national security detention
context, far more than in the criminal prosecution context, evidence
may be almost entirely within the government’s custody; indeed it may
be dispersed among different federal agencies. However, the Court
did not use the word “material,” which limits what the state must disclose under the Brady rule.286 Instead, the Court stated that the state
must disclose “relevant” evidence.287 This suggests a broader discovery standard than at a criminal trial, which is sensible, as habeas process does not culminate in a trial but rather judicial review of the
evidence.
Still, the Court left important issues open, as in Hamdi. The
Court did not define the standard for granting discovery, the burden
of proof, or the underlying standard for detention. Nor did the Court
rule out the possibility that some other judicial process could be con279

Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978).
See 553 U.S. at 785 (“This is a risk inherent in any process that, in the words of the
former Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, is ‘closed and accusatorial.’” (citing Bismullah
v. Gates (Bismullah III), 514 F.3d 1291, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam))).
281
Id.
282
Id. at 786.
283
Id.; see supra notes 108–15 and accompanying text.
284
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 786.
285
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the suppression by
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”); see infra Part III.A.
286
See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
287
See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
280
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stitutionally adequate: “We do not endeavor to offer a comprehensive
summary of the requisites for an adequate substitute for habeas
corpus.”288
The Court was clear in rejecting the view that the Due Process
Clause supplants habeas corpus, and it did not suggest that the Due
Process Clause incorporates habeas corpus.289 The Suspension Clause
operates independently. The Court cited to habeas cases and federal
habeas practice, noting that “[f]ederal habeas petitioners long have
had the means to supplement the record on review, even in the postconviction habeas setting.”290 At times the Court highlighted the importance of having an “Article III court in the exercise of its habeas
corpus function” review the record.291 As part of the mixed discussion, the Court also drew from due process principles and jurisprudence—but in a careful way, without suggesting that due process
applied or operated as a limit. The Boumediene Court walked a delicate line. The Court clearly felt it needed to describe habeas process
in some detail, justifiably fearing that lower courts would not comply
with a bare command to simply examine authorization for a detention. Nor was the Court wrong to make the links to Mathews and
Hamdi.292 The Court, after all, articulated throughout that it relied on
the Suspension Clause alone to secure habeas process independent of
any prior process.
C. What is an Adequate Substitute for Habeas?
Dissenting Justices advocated a different view of the relationship
between the Suspension Clause and the Due Process Clause. In particular, the debate between the majority and Chief Justice Roberts elucidates the difference between using a due process versus a habeas
process analysis.
Roberts began his dissent by defining habeas corpus in procedural terms, stating: “Habeas is most fundamentally a procedural right, a
mechanism for contesting the legality of executive detention.”293
288

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779.
See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 121, § 7.2[d]; supra note 30 and accompanying
text; see generally Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional
Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 862 (1994) (discussing the
possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause incorporates the Suspension Clause against the states).
290
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 786.
291
Id. at 790.
292
Cf. Neuman, supra note 30, at 553 (noting the Mathews citation as “[p]erhaps the
most significant innovation of the Boumediene opinion,” which “could be cause for regret”).
293
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 802 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts also
accused the Court of providing due process protections to Guantánamo detainees, but
“without bothering to say what due process rights the detainees possess.” Id. at 801 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
289
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Roberts’s view is that due process analysis can displace habeas analysis,
placing him in dispute with the majority about the relationship between due process and habeas corpus. The Boumediene petitioners
were not citizens (only Hamdi and two others detained abroad post-9/
11 have been U.S. citizens).294 Roberts argued, “[S]urely the Due Process Clause does not afford non-citizens in such circumstances greater
protection than citizens are due.”295 He added that if prior CSRT process was adequate, “there is no need to reach the Suspension Clause
question” since “[d]etainees will have received all the process the
Constitution could possibly require, whether that process is called
‘habeas’ or something else.”296 He ignored, however, that habeas can
offer noncitizens more than due process; habeas may be a “mechanism for contesting the legality” of a detention, but it is not merely a
“procedural right.”297
The Boumediene majority opinion almost entirely spoke past the
dissent, because it adopted a fundamentally different view that the
Suspension Clause guarantees a process independent of due process.
As a result, the Court also had a completely different view of Hamdi
and the adequacy of the DTA. The Court pointed out that Hamdi was
not a case about habeas process, but rather due process: “None of the
parties in Hamdi argued there had been a suspension of the writ. Nor
could they.”298 As a result, the Hamdi plurality “concentrated on
whether the Executive had the authority to detain and, if so, what
rights the detainee had under the Due Process Clause.”299 The
Boumediene Court noted crucially that “there are places in the Hamdi
plurality opinion where it is difficult to tell where its extrapolation of
§ 2241 ends and its analysis of the petitioner’s Due Process rights begins.”300 As a result, the Hamdi plurality “had no occasion to define
the necessary scope of habeas review, for Suspension Clause
purposes.”301
Roberts countered that due process should begin and end the
analysis, analogizing to postconviction habeas. As the majority noted,
the DTA provided for a form of judicial review of detentions, includ294

Jeffrey Kahn, Responses to the Ten Questions, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5041, 5042

(2010).
295

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 804 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
297
Id. at 802 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
298
Id. at 784.
299
Id.
300
Id.
301
Id. (“The closest the plurality came to doing so was in discussing whether, in light
of separation-of-powers concerns, § 2241 should be construed to prohibit the District
Court from inquiring beyond the affidavit Hamdi’s custodian provided in answer to the
detainee’s habeas petition. The plurality answered this question with an emphatic ‘no.’”
(citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 527, 535–36 (2004))).
296
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ing review in the D.C. Circuit of CSRT “standards and procedures”
and whether they are “lawful.”302 Roberts argued that this administrative process, followed by judicial review, should be pursued before entertaining a habeas petition.303 Roberts deemed CSRTs “the first tier
of collateral review.”304
Roberts’s argument has faced the criticism that “[u]nless [it] was
inadvertently misphrased, it totally misconceives the scope of the
writ.”305 Indeed, postconviction habeas was an inapposite analogy in
the detention context. CSRTs are not collateral; they do not follow a
final judgment that receives deference. The Boumediene Court properly considered the executive decision to detain and ongoing administrative reassessment in CSRTs as perhaps relevant to due process
analysis but irrelevant to habeas process, where the question is
whether detentions are legally authorized. The Court suggested that
CSRTs were error prone,306 perhaps influenced by a report describing
shoddy CSRT process, which noted that “[t]he Government did not
produce any witnesses in any hearing and did not present any documentary evidence to the detainee prior to the hearing in 96% of the
cases.”307
For the majority, the question was not whether the DTA scheme
satisfied due process. Instead, the Court asked whether the scheme
was an effective substitute for habeas corpus. The Court held that
DTA review of CSRT “standards and procedures” was not an effective
substitute where the courts of appeals had no clear ability to: (i) develop facts, (ii) consider evidence outside the record, (iii) examine
authorization for detention, or (iv) provide the remedy of release.308
All Justices agreed that the scope of habeas corpus review may be
sensitive to prior process, and all Justices also agreed that the Suspension Clause either guarantees a right to habeas process or an adequate
substitute. The Court took the view that the adequate-substitute analysis is a habeas analysis—asking whether federal judges retain indepen302
See id. at 788 (describing the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148,
§ 1005(e)(2), 119 Stat. 2739, 2742–43).
303
Id. at 805 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[I]t is not necessary to consider the availability of the writ until the statutory remedies have been shown to be inadequate to protect the
detainees’ rights.”).
304
Id. at 810 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
305
Neuman, supra note 30, at 547.
306
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 785 (“[T]here is considerable risk of error in [CSRT’] findings of fact.”).
307
Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 232, at 2; see also Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d
981, 1006–07 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citing Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra
note 232, at 37–39) (mentioning the study in the course of determining that CSRT process
“is not an adequate substitute for the habeas writ”); Marc D. Falkoff, Litigation and Delay at
Guantánamo Bay, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 393, 394 (2007) (describing Guantánamo detainees
as “denied absolutely their day in court”).
308
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 788–90.
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dent ability to fully examine the authorization for a detention—and
not a due process analysis, which would simply ask whether at any
stage some actor provides some minimally adequate process. The
Court, in my view, had the analysis right.
The only nonpostconviction decision in which the Court has suggested there could be an adequate substitute for habeas is INS v. St.
Cyr, which Roberts relied upon in his Boumediene dissent.309 The St.
Cyr decision supports, in fact, the Boumediene majority. The Court, in
St. Cyr, suggested that Congress could provide an “adequate substitute” to habeas review of immigration detention, but also that “serious
constitutional questions” would be raised under the Suspension
Clause should statutes be interpreted to bar review of constitutional or
legal questions.310 Indeed, the Court’s St. Cyr decision emphasized
that the scope of habeas review must remain at its broadest in the
detention context.311 The Court’s Boumediene decision also highlighted how the Suspension Clause ensures adequate and effective review of not just constitutional and legal questions but also of factual
questions.
Most important, though, was the distinction brought out by the
dialogue with Roberts’s dissent, emphasizing that prior executive process, while relevant to a due process analysis, does not absolve the judiciary of its Suspension Clause obligation to conduct a habeas process
asking whether a detention is authorized.312 This distinction strengthens the view that judges should treat habeas corpus as independent of
due process.
D. Process and Jurisdiction
The Boumediene Court drew from due process in a second, less
supported way. The Court incorporated a due process–type analysis
into the question of whether a court has what it termed “jurisdiction”
to entertain a habeas petition by an alien detained abroad. Due process may not limit process under the Suspension Clause, but it informs
the geographic scope of the writ. The issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction is complex and has been carefully analyzed elsewhere.313 For
309
Id. at 814 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 306
(2001)).
310
See 533 U.S. at 301 n.13, 304–05, 314 & n.38.
311
Id. at 301.
312
See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
313
See generally Anthony J. Colangelo, “De Facto Sovereignty”: Boumediene and Beyond,
77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623 (2009) (describing “de facto sovereignty” and its relationship to
habeas in the extraterritorial detention context); Ernesto Hernández-López, Boumediene
v. Bush and Guantánamo, Cuba: Does the “Empire Strike Back”?, 62 SMU L. REV. 117, 167–88
(2009) (discussing the “legal anomaly” of the United States’ extraterritorial reach into
Guantánamo); Neuman, supra note 38 (examining Boumediene’s “functional approach” to
extraterritorial application of U.S. constitutional limitations).
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these purposes, I note that the Court distilled the extraterritorial
reach of the Suspension Clause into a three-factor “framework”: “(1)
the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the
process through which that status determination was made; (2) the
nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took
place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.”314 The first factor includes three subfactors, and the sites of apprehension and detention might be
different, creating six subparts in total.
Of particular interest here is the last subfactor within the first factor. In requiring an examination of the adequacy of prior process to
establish jurisdiction to hear a habeas petition, the Court focused on
due process once again. The Court contrasted adequacy of the process provided in Johnson v. Eisentrager315 with informal CSRT process.
In Eisentrager, German operatives initially captured in China and then
detained in Germany after World War II received a detailed charge
and military trial, at which the court convicted them of violating the
law of war (although military trials were rather summary at the time,
they were at least adversary and the defendants received counsel).316
One of the crucial differences between Boumediene and Eisentrager was
that the Guantánamo detainees disputed that they were detainable enemies, whereas the Eisentrager operatives did not contest their
status.317
This portion of the Boumediene opinion is inconsistent with the
thrust of the habeas process outlined, designed to inquire into the
cause of a detention. The Court’s prior ruling in Rasul v. Bush that
Guantánamo detainees have jurisdiction to file habeas petitions
adopted a different approach, viewing “jurisdiction” as concerned primarily with the ability of the court to command the jailer.318 The
Boumediene Court instead viewed jurisdiction as flexible and connected
with the detainee’s identity and citizenship, together with other practical considerations.319 Where the Court otherwise held that habeas
314

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.
339 U.S. 763 (1950).
316
Id. at 765–66, 780–81.
317
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766–67.
318
See 542 U.S. 466, 478–79 (2004).
319
Justice Kennedy advanced the same Eisentrager “framework” in his concurring opinion in Rasul. See id. at 485–88 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Prior to Rasul, the issue of the
extraterritorial reach of constitutional rights and habeas corpus jurisdiction had arisen in
several contexts, each discussed in Boumediene and extensively analyzed in the scholarly
literature. For example, immigration decisions adopt a territorial view that an alien, until
admitted into the United States, does not possess due process rights. See United States ex
rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542–44 (1950) (“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.” (citing
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892), and Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S.
160 (1948))); David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens:
315
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process reaches further than due process, the jurisdictional holding
recognizes that practicalities may limit the reach of habeas process.

PROCESS

IN THE

III
SHADOW

OF

BOUMEDIENE

In Boumediene, the Court established that the Suspension Clause is
a source of habeas process for detainees; to give that process contours,
however, the Court turned to due process sources.320 The Court did
not answer the “key question” whether enemy alien detainees “have
any due process rights.”321 Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent, argued
that the result would lead to “a set of shapeless procedures.”322 Roberts may have predicted correctly, but perhaps only because lower
courts have adopted reasoning mirroring his dissent by focusing on
due process, not habeas process. The Court left it to the lower courts
to fill in the details,323 and in response, they drew broadly from due
process and habeas jurisprudence.324 The D.C. Circuit has noted that
Boumediene did not provide “a detailed procedural regime” but rather
“a spare but momentous guarantee that a ‘judicial officer must have
adequate authority to make a determination in light of the relevant
law and facts.’”325 The result provides process “in the shadow of
Boumediene.”326
The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 53–54 (describing the development of the Court’s doctrine holding Congress’s power to exclude aliens as plenary).
Yet even in the Court’s rulings addressing nonadmitted noncitizens, the Court permitted
review (as in Eisentrager) of whether the detention was authorized. Knauff, 338 U.S. at
542–47; see Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764 (“[Q]uestions of extraterritoriality turn on objective
factors and practical concerns, not formalism.”); Marc D. Falkoff & Robert Knowles,
Bagram, Boumediene, and Limited Government, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 851, 879–87 (2010) (arguing for a “limited government” interpretation of the rulings); Fallon, Jr. & Meltzer, supra
note 22, at 2097 (arguing that courts “traditionally pursued a pragmatically adaptive
approach”).
320
Baher Azmy termed this a “largely unlimited invitation” to create a “new common
law of habeas.” Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the New Common Law of
Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 450 (2010).
321
Yin, supra note 199, at 414.
322
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 801 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the decision
replaced statutes “with a set of shapeless procedures to be defined by federal courts at
some future date”).
323
Id. at 796 (“[T]he other remaining questions are within the expertise and competence of the District Court to address in the first instance.”).
324
See generally BENJAMIN WITTES ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION: THE GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING 1–3 (2010) (describing the lower
courts’ initial work in carrying out the task delegated to them); Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, Note,
Meeting Boumediene’s Challenge: The Emergence of an Effective Habeas Jurisprudence and Obsolescence of New Detention Legislation, 95 MINN. L. REV. 244, 247 (2010) (arguing that the lower
courts’ habeas litigation should be allowed to proceed and develop, and that Congress
should not legislatively intervene).
325
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Boumediene, 553
U.S. at 787).
326
Id. at 877.
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If due process is to influence habeas, one can imagine opening
the door either too broadly or too narrowly. The D.C. Circuit maintains that no due process or other constitutional rights run to detainees at Guantánamo Bay, aside from Suspension Clause rights.327 One
could argue that if no due process right exists, then no habeas remedy
exists. That view is wrong and it is untenable after Boumediene. One
could try to define the absolute constitutional minimum that the Suspension Clause guarantees. Boumediene, however, did not define a
constitutional floor. Finally, one could supplement the core habeas
process outlined in federal statutes to craft a process that is sensible
under the circumstances—an approach faithful to Hamdi and
Boumediene. However, lower courts have often attempted to hew, as
closely as possible, to some constitutional minimum rather than attempt to carefully give content to the Boumediene-outlined habeas
process.328
The Boumediene Court clarified that federal courts must remain
available to review questions of law and mixed questions of law and
fact raised in detention cases. The Boumediene Court left unresolved
“the content of the law that governs petitioners’ detention” and the
legal bounds of the government’s detention authority.329 Since, the
D.C. Circuit has grappled with that complex question and subsequently interpreted the authority to detain as fairly broad, which includes the authority to detain all individuals who were “part of” alQaeda.330 Following the Hamdi plurality, the adopted standard asks
whether a detention is authorized by the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which Congress enacted just after September 11,
2001.331 I do not address whether that detention standard is appropri327

See Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
See Huq, supra note 236, at 421, 428 (noting that “[t]he black-letter law of detention, and the implementation of that law by the government, is no clearer, no more stable,
and no more coherent than it was before Boumediene,” but “[d]etention policy thus largely
unspools in the shadow of the Suspension Clause”).
329
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798.
330
See, e.g., Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11–12 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Once Awad was part
of al Qaeda by joining the al Qaeda fighters . . . the requirements of the AUMF were
satisfied.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872–73 (reasoning
that the scope of the government’s detention authority “includes those who are part of
forces associated with Al Qaeda or the Taliban or those who purposefully and materially
support such forces”).
331
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (authorizing “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons”); see Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-84, §§ 948a(7), 948b(a), 948c, 123 Stat. 2574, 2575–76 (defining “unprivileged
enemy belligerent” to include a person who “was a part of al Qaeda”); Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948a(1), 120 Stat. 2600, 2601 (defining “unlawful
enemy combatant” to include a person “who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated
328

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\98-1\CRN102.txt

94

unknown

Seq: 48

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

1-NOV-12

15:10

[Vol. 98:47

ate, a much-debated question.332 Federal legislation has now adopted
an AUMF (and law of war) standard in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.333
A crucial step toward elaborating the habeas process outlined in
Boumediene would be to apply the law to the facts and develop factual
questions. Indeed, the district court on remand ordered the release
of Lakhdar Boumediene and the four others, finding that the government lacked factual support for its contentions.334 The inquiry is a
traditional one, based not on due process rights of detainees but on
whether the detainees fall within the legal category of people who may
lawfully be detained. However, due process jurisprudence would certainly be relevant to elaborate that process, even if the ultimate question is one of whether a detention is authorized. The Court left the
particulars of the process open in Boumediene, stating, for example, as
to the standard of proof, that “[t]he extent of the showing required of
the Government in these cases is a matter to be determined.”335 The
Court held that a detainee must have a meaningful opportunity to
access exculpatory evidence and contest facts and the possibility of
release. How would factual review proceed?
A. Burden of Proof and Immigration Habeas Analogies
After Boumediene, federal district Judge Thomas F. Hogan in the
District of Columbia developed a case management order (CMO) designed to handle a set of consolidated Guantánamo petitions; other
district court judges have tended to follow the order.336 In its first
forces”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“Congress has
in fact authorized Hamdi’s detention, through the AUMF.”); Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872–73.
332
See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 37, at 2131 (approving of the Hamdi plurality’s
conclusion that the AUMF provides an independent source of authority for establishing
military commissions); Huq, supra note 236, at 416 (“If ongoing detentions can be defended by a detention power that is redefined by statute four years into the detention,
there is little to prevent an amendment of the law so as to justify post hoc propter hoc
detentions that otherwise would be illegal.”). Robert Chesney has argued that in practice,
questions of the scope of authorization have largely not come up, but rather cases have
turned on the sufficiency of the government’s evidence. See Robert M. Chesney, Who May
Be Held? Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 772–73 (2011).
333
See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
§ 1021, 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011) (affirming the position that the AUMF authorizes the
government to detain a “person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the
Taliban, or associated forces”).
334
Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197–98 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[B]ecause the
Government has failed to establish . . . that Messrs. Boumediene, Nechla, Boudella, Ait
Idir, and Lahmar are enemy combatants, the Court must, and will, grant their petitions
and order their release.”).
335
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787 (2008).
336
See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-0442 (TFH), 2008 WL 4858241, at
*1–4 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008) (case management order). The CMO provides that district
court judges “may alter the framework based on the particular facts and circumstances of
[the] individual cases.” Id. at *1 n.1; see, e.g., Mohammed v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3
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sentence, the CMO cites to Hamdi and Boumediene.337 The CMO crucially “placed upon the Government the burden of establishing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the lawfulness of the petitioner’s detention,”338 though the government could also benefit from “a rebuttable presumption of accuracy and authenticity” if there were a
showing of great need in a case.339 When detainees challenged the
CMO as inadequate, the D.C. Circuit approved the procedures, reasoning backward from Hamdi’s due process analysis rather than reasoning forward from Boumediene.340 The Al-Bihani v. Obama panel
reasoned that the Hamdi plurality “described as constitutionally adequate—even for the detention of U.S. citizens—a ‘burden-shifting
scheme’ in which the government need only present ‘credible evidence that the habeas petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria’
before ‘the onus could shift to the petitioner to rebut that evidence.’”341 The D.C. Circuit concluded that such a process “mirrors a
preponderance standard” like that in the CMO.342
The choice of standard of proof goes to the heart of the habeas
process developed in Boumediene. Recall that the CSRT process, which
the Boumediene Court found lacking, used a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, while the Hamdi plurality rejected a “some-evidence”
standard.343 The D.C. Circuit did not reach the question of what process the Suspension Clause or the Due Process Clause mandated and
suggested that even a “some evidence, reasonable suspicion, or probable cause standard of proof could constitutionally suffice.”344 A subsequent D.C. Circuit panel in Al-Adahi “assume[d] arguendo” that the
government must meet a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.345
The panel urged the government to pursue a “some-evidence” standard, citing to immigration removal decisions prior to the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act.346 Chief Justice Roberts cited similar
(D.D.C. 2009) (“This Court adopted, in large part, the provisions of [the CMO], while
modifying it somewhat . . . .”).
337
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 2008 WL 4858241, at *1 (case management order).
338
Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
339
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 2008 WL 4858241, at *3 (case management order).
340
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
341
Id. (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533–34 (2004) (plurality opinion)).
342
Id. at 878 & n.4.
343
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 788 (2008); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537.
344
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 878 n.4. Similarly, other courts often rely on the Court’s
Hamdi language describing a burden-shifting framework. See, e.g., Sulayman v. Obama, 729
F. Supp. 2d 26, 34 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534).
345
Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1104–05 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The panel chiefly
relied upon INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 306 (2001), and Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651,
659 (1892).
346
Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1104–05; see St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 306 (“In [pre-1952 deportation] cases, other than the question whether there was some evidence to support the order, the courts generally did not review factual determinations made by the Executive.”
(footnote omitted) (citing Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659)). See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The
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cases in his Boumediene dissent—a passage the D.C. Circuit mimicked—and noted that factual review “is traditionally more limited in
some contexts than in others, depending on the status of the detainee
and the rights he may assert.”347
Citing to immigration habeas rulings was an ironic choice, as discussed, since those rulings particularly highlight the availability of
habeas corpus despite a lack of due process.348 Indeed, the argument
for a some-evidence standard confuses due process with habeas
corpus. The some-evidence standard arises from the earliest procedural due process rulings, predating “sufficiency-of-the-evidence” review
under the Administrative Procedure Act that later became the model
for judicial review of immigration decisions.349 The some-evidence
standard has few vestiges left. A some-evidence standard is still used in
challenges in extradition proceedings,350 a context in which treaty obligations and the fact that criminal process will take place abroad may
explain the degree of deference.351 A second place where a someevidence standard may still persist is in challenges to expedited removal; however in that context, full habeas review remains as to status
questions.352
The some-evidence standard is an outlier in immigration habeas
and judicial review. Somewhat more searching “substantial-evidence”
or sufficiency-of-the-evidence review is used by courts of appeals when
considering petitions for review of removal and asylum decisions.353
Constitutional Requirement of “Some Evidence,” 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 631, 631–35 (1988) (surveying the history, nature, justifications, and applications of the some-evidence standard).
347
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 814 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
348
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
349
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2006) (providing for substantial evidence test for on the
record administrative adjudication); Neuman, supra note 346, at 643–46, 731–32. Similarly, in postconviction law, some-evidence review has been replaced by sufficiency-of-theevidence review under the standard in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See
Neuman, supra note 346, at 656. Such some-evidence review is distinct from Mathews review, since it relates to review of fact-finding and not procedure. Id. at 697–98.
350
See Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 854 (1st Cir. 1980) (“Our review . . . is limited to
determining whether in fact there was ‘any’ evidence providing . . . a ‘reasonable ground
to believe the accused guilty.’” (quoting Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925)));
Neuman, supra note 346, at 736.
351
See Fernandez, 268 U.S. at 312 (noting, in the context of an extradition treaty with
Mexico, that “every technical detail” need not “be proved beyond a reasonable doubt” and
that “[f]orm is not to be insisted upon beyond the requirements of safety and justice”).
352
The Immigration and Nationality Act preserves habeas review of status-related
questions in expedited removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) (2006); see Neuman,
supra note 30, at 577.
353
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[A]dministrative findings of fact [in specified contexts] are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary . . . .”); id. § 1252(b)(4)(D) (judicial review of asylum). The Immigration and
Nationality Act, amended by the 2005 REAL ID Act, bars habeas review of an order of
removal of criminal aliens, but permits petitions for review to be filed in a court of appeals
regarding “constitutional claims or questions of law.” See id. § 1252(a)(2)(A)–(B), (D).
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Moreover, federal courts of appeals have preserved their independent
ability to assure adequate factual support for a detention by occasionally remanding cases to the immigration agency for additional factfinding.354 As developed in Part IV, still broader de novo review exists
over factual questions related to status, such as whether the person is a
U.S. citizen.355 Habeas review also remains unaltered for immigration
challenges related to length of detention, which share similarities to
challenges to indefinite military detention.356 The Court in Zadvydas
v. Davis insisted on careful judicial review of noncitizens indefinitely
detained pending removal, even where statutes already provided procedures requiring periodic evaluations of detentions, noting that “[a]
statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem.”357
This judicial review exists despite the fact that generally in the
immigration context, underlying power to define who may be admitted or removed falls within a very broad congressional “plenary
power,” and as a result, “the substantive criteria for entry to or removal from the United States became immunized from judicial review.”358 The limited contexts in which some-evidence review is still
used are a poor analogy when considering the detention of enemy
aliens “for the duration of hostilities that may last a generation or
more.”359 Nor are those contexts even representative of how immigration law handles judicial review of detention.
Moreover, distinctions between questions of law, mixed questions
of law and fact, and factual questions are notoriously blurry. In immigration cases, courts have sometimes generously interpreted de novo
review of legal and constitutional questions to include mixed and
heavily factual questions.360 Still, other federal courts do not take that
354
See, e.g., Rafaelano v. Wilson, 471 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006); Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Habeas Corpus,
91 CORNELL L. REV. 459, 481–82 (2006).
355
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B).
356
The relevant statutes do not explicitly exempt detention-related habeas challenges;
rather, the statutory provisions limiting judicial review refer only to removal orders. See 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9); Gerald L. Neuman, On the Adequacy of Direct Review After the Real ID Act
of 2005, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133, 138, 141 (2006–2007). The legislative history stated as
much. H.R. REP. NO. 109-72, at 175–76 (2005) (Conf. Rep.) (stating section 106 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act would “not preclude habeas review over challenges to
detention that are independent of challenges to removal orders”).
357
533 U.S. 678, 687, 690, 699–702 (2001); see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
358
Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 618 (2006).
359
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008).
360
See, e.g., Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 654 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
(“[T]he phrase ‘questions of law’ as it is used in . . . the Real ID Act includes review of the
application of statutes and regulations to undisputed historical facts.” (footnote omitted));
Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 329 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting a strict
rule, but explaining that “[t]he court would need to determine, regardless of the rhetoric
employed in the petition, whether it merely quarrels over the correctness of the factual
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approach, restricting review largely to “pure” questions of law.361
Questions remain about whether such an interpretation of the 2005
REAL ID Act, which consolidated and altered judicial review of removal and other immigration decisions, violates the Suspension
Clause by unduly constraining federal courts.
A focus on habeas process suggests a reason for why the someevidence standard is marginalized in immigration law—and why judicial review is at its height in the detention context. The habeas statutes have long allowed, just as at common law, a detainee to rebut the
government’s allegations, including by introducing new factual evidence.362 While habeas process does not specify a standard of proof,
it fundamentally permits a meaningful challenge to the legality of a
detention. A some-evidence standard does not permit a meaningful
assessment of the legality of a detention; it would permit a detention
to stand regardless of the evidence the detainee presents, perhaps restricting relief to only the extreme cases in which the government’s
claims are themselves highly implausible on their face. For that reason, the Hamdi plurality rejected the government’s proposed someevidence standard.363 Similarly, the Boumediene Court emphasized
that habeas corpus must include “some authority to assess the sufficiency of the Government’s evidence against the detainee.”364 After
all, even postconviction habeas considers some new evidence—judges
may conduct hearings where a petitioner “failed” to develop facts in
state court.365
A preponderance standard is used in habeas, typically postconviction and after a criminal trial. In that context, a sufficiency-of-theevidence standard is the constitutional standard for evaluating
whether a jury had sufficient evidence to find guilt under the more
findings or justification for the discretionary choices, in which case the court would lack
jurisdiction, or whether it instead raises a ‘constitutional claim’ or ‘question of law’”); see
also THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLICY 1296 (7th ed. 2012) (“Those courts that are inclined to preserve as much review as
possible tend to find ways to subdivide the questions presented and locate a separately
identifiable question of law, or possibly a due process issue. Other courts are more resistant to such arguments by the petitioner.”).
361
See Viracacha v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 511, 515–16 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S.
969 (2008) (contending that “[b]ecause no administrative case can be decided without
applying some law to some facts,” the Ninth Circuit approach misread the statute, and only
pure questions of law should be examined).
362
28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006). In response, the petitioner may “deny any of the facts set
forth in the return or allege any other material facts.” Id. Then “[t]he court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.” Id.
363
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 537 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“Because we
conclude that due process demands some system for a citizen-detainee to refute his classification, the proposed ‘some evidence’ standard is inadequate.”).
364
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 786.
365
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 429–30 (2000).
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demanding beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard at trial.366 The AlAdahi panel noted that the habeas standard may differ depending on
whether a detention is based on an arrest, selective services decision,
immigration detention, or a court martial.367 Unsurprisingly, deferential factual review might follow a military trial.368
Habeas process may be sensitive to prior process, but only where
there was judicial process and where federal judges retain an adequate
and effective ability to exercise their independent role in examining
the authorization for the detention. As the Court developed in
Boumediene, the government faces a higher burden when attempting
to justify an indefinite detention.369 In Al-Bihani, the D.C. Circuit
claimed that “traditional habeas review did not entail review of factual
findings,” which, as developed in Parts I and II, is incorrect as a matter
of historical practice, federal statutes, and Supreme Court law in the
detention context.370 With this sort of confused understanding of review, it is no wonder that the D.C. Circuit adopted the wrong standard. As in civil detentions,371 a “clear-and-convincing” standard may
be appropriate.372 An even more demanding standard would still pro366

See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321, 326 (1979).
See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1104–05 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Although we
doubt, for the reasons stated above, that the Suspension Clause requires the use of the
preponderance standard, we will not decide the question in this case.”).
368
Chief Justice Roberts cited three cases involving military trials and the some-evidence standard when arguing that habeas may be “traditionally more limited in some contexts than in others.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 814 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
369
Id. at 785–86 (contrasting a habeas petition after “the most rigorous proceedings
imaginable, a full criminal trial,” with the “closed and accusatorial” CSRTs, and concluding
that the latter situation justifies more searching scrutiny).
370
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The court cited to In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8 (1946), in which the petitioner received a full military commission
trial.
371
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
372
The D.C. Circuit’s approach has attracted criticism and lacks strong defenders. See
Azmy, supra note 320, at 521–22 (“[I]t makes no more sense to ask if there was sufficient
evidence in the prior CSRT record—so one-sided as it was—to support the military’s judgment than it would to ask if there was sufficient evidence to support a criminal conviction
in a criminal trial in which the defendant was prohibited from calling witnesses or confronting the Government’s evidence.”); Falkoff, supra note 95, at 1017–20 (arguing that
civil commitment cases provide an appropriate standard of proof); see also Fallon, Jr. &
Meltzer, supra note 22, at 2092–93, 2104 (arguing that the preponderance standard is “the
minimum necessary” for citizen-detainees although “not untroubling”); Walter E. Kuhn,
The Terrorist Detention Review Reform Act: Detention Policy and Political Reality, 35 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 221, 242 (2011) (calling it “politically impossible” to adopt a standard lower than
preponderance); Matthew C. Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1410–11 (2008) (proposing preponderance standard for initial detention decisions, but “substantially stricter review” after
appropriate duration). In two cases, petitioners sought certiorari from the U.S. Supreme
Court arguing that a “clear and convincing evidence” standard of proof should be
adopted. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, Al Odah v. United States, No. 10-439 (U.S.
filed Sept. 28, 2010); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28, Awad v. Obama, No. 10-736 (U.S.
filed Nov. 30, 2010). To date, the Court has not granted certiorari on this question. See
367
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vide judges with a great deal of discretion on how they weigh the
evidence.373
B. Postconviction Analogies: Discovery and Fact-Finding
In several areas, judges draw on postconviction habeas rules regarding discovery and fact-finding. This practice is troublesome,
given that in the postconviction context, habeas rules presume that
fact-finding occurred at criminal trial, on appeal, or during the state
postconviction process. Indeed, as additional support for a preponderance standard of proof, the D.C. Circuit noted in federal habeas
challenges to state convictions that the petitioner must rebut factual
findings by clear and convincing evidence.374 Yet that rule applies after a state criminal trial and any state posttrial fact-finding.
The district court’s CMO provides a sensible procedure, mirroring the statutory procedure under the habeas statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2243, requiring that the government submit a return that “stat[es]
the factual and legal bases for detaining that prisoner,” who then
“file[s] a traverse stating the relevant facts in support of his petition
and a rebuttal of the Government’s legal justification for his detention.”375 Perhaps modeled on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule
26(a), the CMO permits automatic disclosure where if requested,
the government shall disclose to the petitioner: (1) any documents
or objects in its possession that are referenced in the factual return;
(2) all statements, in whatever form, made or adopted by the petitioner that relate to the information contained in the factual return;
and (3) information about the circumstances in which such statements of the petitioner were made or adopted.376

Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Al Odah v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 1812 (2011); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 1814 (2011).
373
See Nesbitt, supra note 324, at 268–72 (describing variation between judges in applying standards).
374
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 878 (“If it is constitutionally permissible to place that higher
burden on a citizen petitioner in a routine case, it follows a priori that placing a lower
burden on the government defending a wartime detention—where national security interests are at their zenith and the rights of the alien petitioner at their nadir—is also
permissible.”).
375
Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see In re Guantanamo Bay
Detainee Litig., No. 08-0442 (TFH), 2008 WL 4858241, at *1–3 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008) (case
management order).
376
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 2008 WL 4858241, at *2 (case management order);
Colin C. Pogge, Note, A Dissentious “Debate”: Shaping Habeas Procedures Post-Boumediene, 88
TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1090–91 (2010).
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The CMO rules were later revised to refer solely to evidence relied
upon “to justify detention,” not to all evidence relied upon in the
return.377
Further discovery beyond those categories is provided by leave of
the Court “for good cause” shown.378 The CMO quotes verbatim the
discovery standard in federal habeas corpus cases, but adds that such
requests must (1) ”be narrowly tailored,” (2) “specify the discovery
sought,” (3) explain why the request is “likely to produce evidence
that demonstrates that the petitioner’s detention is unlawful,” and (4)
explain why the request is not “unfairly disrupting or unduly burdening the government.”379 The CMO requirements appear adapted
from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.380 Detainees may face difficulties in making itemized requests if they cannot know what the
government possesses. Automatic disclosures are better suited to the
habeas process.
As discussed, Boumediene emphasized that traditionally a detainee
can supplement the record and introduce exculpatory evidence in response to the government’s return.381 The CMO required the government to produce “all reasonably available evidence in its possession
that tends materially to undermine the information presented to support the government’s justification for detaining the petitioner.”382
The standard refers to information the government chooses to present. It is not as broad as Brady requires at a criminal trial, since it
does not hold the government responsible for disclosing all material
exculpatory evidence.383 To be sure, the D.C. Circuit later clarified
that the government must supply “information that has been strategically filtered out” when preparing the return, even if the “individual
doing the filtering” works for a different agency than the Department
of Justice (DOJ).384 In contrast, another judge adopted a modified
377
See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-0442 (TFH), 2008 WL 5245890, at
*1 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2008) (order amending case management order).
378
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 2008 WL 4858241, at *2 (case management order).
379
Id.
380
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)–(c) (“For good cause, the court may order discovery of any
matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need
not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.”).
381
See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
382
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 2008 WL 4858241, at *1 (case management order)
(citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 786 (2008)). One judge modified the standard
to state that the government must supply exculpatory evidence “contained in the material
reviewed in developing the return for the petitioner, and in preparation for the hearing
for the petitioner.” Al Shurfa v. Bush, 588 F. Supp. 2d 12, 14 (D.D.C. 2008).
383
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
384
Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 724 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Similarly, the revised
CMO notes the Government must supply “evidence contained in any information reviewed
by attorneys preparing factual returns for all detainees.” See In re Guantanamo Bay De-
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CMO ordering production of exculpatory evidence that “the Government can obtain through reasonable diligence.”385 Interestingly, one
judge required DOJ lawyers familiar with the Brady standard to search
for exculpatory evidence, not Department of Defense lawyers.386 Federal judges have ordered discovery over government objection in detainee cases.387
On balance, the D.C. Circuit appropriately interpreted language
in Boumediene highlighting the importance of access to the government’s evidence. Yet, unlike in the criminal procedure context,
where the Brady duty exists regardless of whether the detainee requests evidence, courts in habeas proceedings require itemized requests, although they carve out some exceptions for evidence
presumptively subject to disclosure. In addition, judges focus on evidence the government relies upon, implying that the government may
determine whether evidence is material. Any other requests must be
specific, narrow, and not unduly burdensome, and a detainee must
show that requested evidence is “specific and exculpatory on its
face,”388 which is unrealistic in the context. While district judges cite
to Brady, they do not apply the Brady due process standard.389 And for
habeas cases, the remedy for a violation is not a new criminal trial, as
Brady provides.390 In several decisions where judges found that the
government failed to turn over exculpatory evidence, the result was
not a new trial, since trials are not part of the habeas context. Instead,
uncovering violations might bring to light evidence undercutting the
case for detention.391
Perhaps a higher standard of proof would create stronger incentives for the government to justify a detention with more complete
evidence, which would then make discovery more rigorous. Discovery
occurs, however, against a backdrop of secrecy—but this is not necessarily problematic. The Boumediene Court emphasized that federal
courts could and should accommodate “to the greatest extent possible” the interest “in protecting sources and methods of intelligence
gathering.”392 Thus, the CMO provides for review of classified infortainee Litig., No. 08-0442 (TFH), 2008 WL 5245890, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2008) (order
amending case management order).
385
Al-Adahi v. Bush, 585 F. Supp. 2d 78, 78–80 (D.D.C. 2008).
386
Batarfi v. Bush, 602 F. Supp. 2d 118, 119–20 (D.D.C. 2009).
387
Zaid v. Bush, 596 F. Supp. 2d 11, 12–13 (D.D.C. 2009).
388
Bin Attash v. Obama, 628 F. Supp. 2d 24, 31 (D.D.C. 2009).
389
See id.; Bismullah v. Gates, 503 F.3d 137, 140 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (addressing a claim
that the DTA requires broader discovery than Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
390
See Brady, 373 U.S. at 88–89.
391
See Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that “the CSRT was
not provided with exculpatory evidence on the same point,” which emerged from a different detainee’s CSRT).
392
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 796 (2008).
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mation by counsel or in camera.393 On the other hand, judges have
expressed frustration with government reliance on undocumented
sources, making it difficult to assess the reliability of intelligence
reports.394
In one final respect, the D.C. Circuit also relied, incorrectly in my
view, on procedures in the habeas statute when making an extreme
claim that there is no entitlement to an evidentiary hearing “as of
right.”395 In Al-Bihani, the D.C. Circuit found denial of an evidentiary
hearing appropriate by citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), which limits
judges’ discretion to conduct hearings in postconviction cases.396 The
D.C. Circuit reasoned that the lower court “did hear the facts of AlBihani’s case and provided ample opportunity in conference and in a
hearing for the parties to air concerns over evidence.”397 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, which governs postconviction review of state convictions, was
not good support for the court’s conclusion. The Supreme Court
cited to that statute in Boumediene to emphasize how judges conduct a
factual inquiry even “in post-trial habeas cases where the prisoner already has had a full and fair opportunity to develop the factual predicate of his claims.”398 Regardless of the merits of Al-Bihani’s claim, to
say that there is no entitlement to a hearing “as of right” is erroneous
after Boumediene if there has been no prior judicial hearing.
Proceeding by analogy has its perils. Courts conducting executive detention habeas review cannot simply rely on discovery standards
developed for postconviction or civil litigation because these standards draw from inapposite sources. To ensure meaningful review,
judges should presumptively conduct evidentiary hearings where
there has been no prior judicial fact-finding. Most importantly,
Boumediene calls into question the standard of proof that courts have
adopted. Although guidance for handling difficult fact-development
issues is unclear, Boumediene and longstanding executive detention decisions suggest a broader and more flexible process.
C. Criminal Procedure Analogies
In fascinating ways, lower courts draw on constitutional criminal
procedure as a source for guidance, largely in ways compatible with
the goals of a habeas process. Courts import concepts devised to regu393
See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-0442 (TFH), 2008 WL 4858241, at
*2–3 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008) (case management order).
394
See WITTES ET AL., supra note 324, at 40–41 (“[I]t would be unwise for the government to expect a court to admit or give weight to any statement in an intelligence report
when the source is entirely anonymous . . . .”).
395
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
396
Id.
397
Id.
398
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 790 (2008).
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late presentation of evidence at criminal trials into a context without a
jury or a criminal charge. Yet due process protections developed in
criminal cases may suggest fair and accurate process that courts cannot justly deny to any person in custody. Judges generally find ways,
however, to avoid indicating to what degree they rely on criminal procedure analogies.399
1. Hearsay
Take the issue of hearsay evidence, for example. The D.C. Circuit has called it “always admissible,” but with a catch.400 Al-Bihani
argued that the lower court relied mostly upon “government reports
of his interrogation answers,” which, he argued, were “hearsay improperly admitted absent an examination of reliability and necessity.”401 The D.C. Circuit noted that the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause applies only in trials.402 Since a habeas proceeding does not involve a trial, but rather a judge who must weigh
the reliability of the evidence, the Federal Rules of Evidence apply
instead.403
With no trial, there is no formal occasion to consider admissibility. The D.C. Circuit noted: “In Hamdi, the Supreme Court said hearsay ‘may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence’
as long as the petitioner is given the opportunity to rebut that evidence.”404 Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit has said that absent other
evidence corroborating the sources, hearsay alone cannot reliably support a detention.405 Judges have also insisted, without recognizing a
formal confrontation right, that detainees’ lawyers have an opportu399
See, e.g., Al-Madhwani v. Obama, 642 F.3d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting that
the court need not rule on al-Madhwani’s constitutional due process claim that the lower
court relied on evidence outside the record in violation of Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157
(1961), because even if a violation occurred, such error would be harmless).
400
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 879.
401
Id.
402
Id.
403
FED. R. EVID. 1101(e). For a discussion of the argument that hearsay should be
excluded in such proceedings unless falling into an applicable exception under the Federal Rules of Evidence, see Azmy, supra note 320, at 531.
404
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 879 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533–34
(2004) (plurality opinion)); see also Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1111 n.6 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (“Al-Bihani also forecloses Al-Adahi’s argument that admitting hearsay violated his
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.”).
405
Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 846–47 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (describing, in a nonhabeas
DTA case, how “the principal evidence” consisted of documents that “do not say who ‘reported’ or ‘said’ or ‘suspected’” the statements at issue, “[n]or do they provide any of the
underlying reporting upon which” the assertions were made, “nor any assessment of the
reliability of that reporting”); see also WITTES ET AL., supra note 324, at 41–50 (discussing
corroboration requirements for evaluating the reliability of detainee statements obtained
during interrogations).

R
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nity to examine key adverse evidence.406 Thus, although judges have
not imported constitutional tests, they properly place less value on
hearsay when assessing support for a detention.
2. Self-Incrimination
Other criminal procedure protections apply in a different sense.
Although the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
does not apply absent a jury trial,407 federal judges have “drawn no
inference[s] based on [a detainee’s] decision not to testify in [a]
case.”408 Indeed, judges reviewing a record for the purpose of conducting a habeas review operate using some of the same evidentiary
principles as they would at a trial. Applying an effective privilege
against self-incrimination is consistent with a habeas process in which
it is the government’s burden to defend the detention and where the
detainee traditionally was not obligated to testify.
3. Voluntariness of Confessions
Confession statements produced using physical coercion have
fortunately largely disappeared from U.S. courtrooms since the Supreme Court ruled that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments forbade such statements409 and as professional
police turned to use of psychological techniques during interrogations.410 However, government use of harsh interrogation techniques
post-9/11 created difficult problems in relying on the resulting statements to support indefinite detentions. Criminal procedure scholars
have criticized the Court’s focus on “voluntariness” as the touchstone
for admissibility of confessions, arguing that the Court should rather
406
See, e.g., Sadkhan v. Obama, 608 F. Supp. 2d 33, 36–42 (D.D.C. 2009) (granting
some discovery requests while denying other discovery requests that petitioner claimed the
government must comply with pursuant to the CMO disclosure requirements).
407
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself . . . .”).
408
Al Rabiah v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 2d 11, 20–21 (D.D.C. 2009); see also
Kandari v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 2d 11, 22 (D.D.C. 2010) (“The Court has drawn no
inference based on Al Kandari’s decision not to testify in this case.”); Al Odah v. United
States, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2009) (“The Court has drawn no inference based on Al
Odah’s decision not to testify or submit a declaration in this case.”); Awad v. Obama, 646 F.
Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2009) (“No inference was drawn from Awad’s decision not to
testify or from his failure to sign or swear to his affidavit.”).
409
See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286–87 (1936) (holding confessions extracted through torture inadmissible in state proceedings under the Fourteenth Amendment); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (holding involuntary confessions
inadmissible in federal proceedings under the Fifth Amendment).
410
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966) (surveying police interrogation
techniques and concluding that “[e]ven without employing brutality . . . the very fact of
custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness
of individuals”).
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assess whether a statement may be false or contaminated.411 Precisely
because of their different role when reviewing habeas petitions,
judges have developed a remarkable body of case law assessing the
reliability of detainee confessions, which uses criminal procedure only
by analogy.412
For example, in Al Rabiah v. United States, the petitioner argued
that interrogators tortured him and fed him facts to confess.413 The
court found “substantial evidence in the record” supporting Al
Rabiah’s claims that he was told he could not return to Kuwait unless
he confessed:414 “Interrogators told Al Rabiah the ‘evidence’ they had
in their possession (whether it really existed or not), Al Rabiah would
request time to pray or otherwise ask for a break, and then he would
provide a full confession through an elaborate or incredible story.”415
When these spoon-fed accounts designed to “please interrogators”
were inconsistent, the interrogators threatened Al Rabiah with rendition and imposed sleep deprivation.416 Al Rabiah, an ill forty-threeyear-old man with no prior military experience, confessed to taking
over all supply operations in Tora Bora, “a six square mile mountain
complex.”417 Ultimately, the court held that the confession was not
believable. The court noted that since the government had disavowed
all but the most inculpatory portions of its version of the facts “in order
for the evidence in this case to even make sense,” the confessions lacked
“reliability and credibility.”418 The government countered by arguing
that Al Rabiah had repeated his confessions at his CSRT, but the court
found that the effects of abuse and torture had not dissipated by that
time, citing to Fifth Amendment and Due Process decisions concerning voluntariness of a confession under the “totality of the circumstances.”419 However, those references were by way of analogy only.
The court concluded, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
411
See Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051,
1109–13 (2010).
412
Al-Qurashi v. Obama, 733 F. Supp. 2d 69, 78 n.14 (D.D.C. 2010) (“It is also well
established that in criminal proceedings, statements of the accused ‘that are extracted by
threats or violence violate the Due Process Clause.’” (quoting United States v. Karake, 443
F. Supp. 2d 8, 51 (D.D.C. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bostan v. Obama,
674 F. Supp. 2d 9, 30 (D.D.C. 2009) (discussing why coerced evidence might be less reliable, but refusing, where the Government has not produced a witness or supported the
reliability of alleged statements, to conduct “a virtual trial over the efficacy of torture itself—a prospect . . . both distasteful and distracting”).
413
Al Rabiah, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 32–33.
414
Id. at 38.
415
Id. at 39.
416
Id. at 27, 39 (noting the threats and Al Rabiah’s placement in the “frequent flier
program,” which prevented a detainee from resting due to frequent cell transfers).
417
Id. at 34.
418
Id.
419
Id. at 36 (“[T]he Court must consider the ‘totality of the circumstances’ in order to
determine whether there exists evidence from which to find that there was a ‘clean break’
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statements were not reliable evidence supporting Al Rabiah’s
detention.420
Similarly, in a case challenging evidence of Farhi Saeed Bin Mohammed’s confession, the judge concluded that Mohammed’s statements should not be credited because interrogators had tortured
him.421 The court described Mohammed’s diary of torture, which included accounts of brutal treatment and sleep deprivation by Moroccan captors.422 The court further detailed accounts of Mohammed’s
captors feeding him information and asking him to repeat it, as well as
transfers to the “Dark Prison” in Kabul, the Bagram base in Afghanistan, and then finally Guantánamo Bay.423 The government did not
“challenge or deny the accuracy of Binyam Moham[m]ed’s story of
brutal treatment.”424 The court described how confessions “procured
by torture are excluded under the Due Process Clause” since they run
counter to “fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at
the base of all our civil and political institutions.”425 “[C]oercive interrogation techniques” can cause “confabulation” and “false memories,”
and, despite Mohammed’s detailed statements, his “lengthy prior torture” rendered them unreliable.426 Therefore, the court granted the
writ and ordered his release.427
On balance, courts have it right. They do not apply voluntariness
analysis in cases of detainees. Lower courts rule on motions to suppress confession evidence, not from a trial, but rather from an assessment of whether evidence is reliable to support a determination that
the detainee was “part of” al-Qaeda.428 In at least one case, the government conceded that it coerced statements, which resulted in the
between the coercion and the later confessions.” (quoting United States v. Karake, 443 F.
Supp. 2d 8, 87–88 (D.D.C. 2006))).
420
Id.
421
Mohammed v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1, 28 (D.D.C. 2009).
422
Id. at 21–23.
423
Id.
424
Id. at 24.
425
Id. (quoting Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936)).
426
Id. at 27, 29 (quoting Shane O’Mara, Torturing the Brain: On the Folk Psychology and
Folk Neurobiology Motivating “Enhanced and Coercive Interrogation Techniques,” 13 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 497, 498 (2009)).
427
Id. at 32. For a decision finding that the effects of torture had dissipated by the
time of confession, see Anam v. Obama, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7, 10 (D.D.C. 2010).
428
See Sulayman v. Obama, 729 F. Supp. 2d 26, 33, 40 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting that
despite detainees’ lack of due process rights, “statements resulting from coercion may
nonetheless be disregarded due to the ‘likelihood that the [statements are] untrue’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d 8, 50–51 (D.D.C.
2006))). One court emphasized an inapposite concern, finding that because a detainee’s
“will was not overborne . . . , it [would] not disregard the statements [the detainee] made
during his interrogations at Bagram, Kandahar, or Guantanamo Bay.” Abdah v. Obama,
709 F. Supp. 2d 25, 36–37 (D.D.C. 2010).
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court granting a habeas petition.429 Lower courts have ordered discovery on whether “coercion, abuse, or torture” occurred to assess
confession statements.430 In the context of detainee confession statements, or detainee statements inculpating others, judges draw on due
process law only by way of analogy, as part of the reliability inquiry
that they conduct.
4. Harmless Error
The D.C. Circuit imported another doctrine from appellate and
postconviction law: harmless error analysis. The court ruled, for example, that denying Al-Bihani’s discovery requests was harmless error
because “discovery would not have changed the outcome of the
case.”431 More recently, the D.C. Circuit cited a “harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard, quoting the Chapman v. California standard governing state criminal appeals.432 Harmless error rules were
designed to avoid unnecessary trial do-overs. A Chapman harmless error standard requires the government to show error harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt, and, while not unduly onerous, the standard is
somewhat incongruous where there has been no jury conviction finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, unlike after a criminal trial in which a state cannot appeal an acquittal, the D.C. Circuit
has applied a harmless error rule for the government, finding harmful
errors that supported reversal of an order granting habeas corpus.433
The role of harmless error may need to be reconsidered; regardless, it
will necessarily play a reduced role in the context where there is no
trial and only a judge examines authorization for a detention.
Most recently, the D.C. Circuit in Latif v. Obama held, with no
precedent in habeas case law, that courts should afford the accuracy
of government reports, including intelligence, a “presumption of regularity.”434 The court cited to habeas decisions presuming state court
opinions were accurately transcribed.435 As Judge David S. Tatel argued in dissent, such a rule makes sense in the context of court or
business records, but has no place in a habeas inquiry, where the purpose is to evaluate reliability of evidence produced under uncertain,
nontransparent, and nonroutine conditions.436 The result places an429
See Bacha v. Obama, No. 05-2385 (ESH), 2009 WL 2365846, at *1 (D.D.C. July 30,
2009) (order granting habeas petition); Bacha v. Obama, No. 05-2385 (ESH) (Jawad, ISN
900), 2009 WL 2149949, at *1 (D.D.C. July 17, 2009) (order granting motion to suppress).
430
See Rabbani v. Obama, 656 F. Supp. 2d 45, 54 (D.D.C. 2009).
431
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
432
Al-Madhwani v. Obama, 642 F.3d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 23–24 (1967)).
433
Hatim v. Gates, 632 F.3d 720, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
434
666 F.3d 746, 749 (D.C. Cir. 2011), reissued, 677 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
435
See id. at 751 n.2.
436
Id. at 772.
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other important thumb on the scale in favor of the government’s evidence in a manner that is inconsistent with Boumediene’s Suspension
Clause mandate and the role of a habeas judge. Although intelligence reports might be properly presumed accurate in many situations, adopting an across-the-board rule to this effect is unjustified
when some such reports may be of less convincing provenance.
The Supreme Court has not taken up challenges to these procedures. In the meantime, the government has released much of the
Guantánamo population, with comparatively more of the remaining
detainees either difficult to transfer or “[h]igh[ ]value.”437 I have suggested that several procedures, particularly the standard of proof,
raise Suspension Clause problems under Boumediene. To preserve the
independent ability of federal judges to review the authorization of
detention, courts must ensure that the entire set of procedures is adequate and effective. Whether the Supreme Court will ultimately address those questions is another matter.
D. Remedies and Jurisdiction
One additional feature of the adequacy and effectiveness of postBoumediene remedies deserves mention. The Boumediene Court criticized the DTA as not clearly stating that the courts of appeals could
provide the remedy of release, leading the Court to the assumption
that “congressional silence permits a constitutionally required remedy” and that “a remedy of release is impliedly provided for.”438 Yet,
even as to the remedy of release, the Boumediene decision did not
greatly change matters. Releases continue as before, occurring only
when the government arranges the release, even where a court has
granted the writ.439 In Kiyemba v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit ruled that
despite the finding that seventeen detained Uighur Muslims were
nonenemy combatants, the court could not immediately order their
release but must instead await government efforts to find countries
willing to resettle them.440 In a subsequent ruling, the court refused a
remedy, noting twelve accepted resettlement offers (and five rejected
offers) and referring to legislation barring expenditures to bring
Guantánamo detainees to the United States.441
437
See Andrei Scheinkman et al., The Guantánamo Docket: A History of the Detainee Population, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo?hp (last updated Sept. 11,
2012) (stating that 603 detainees at Guantánamo have been transferred, with 167
remaining).
438
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 788 (2008).
439
See Huq, supra note 236, at 410–11, 421.
440
Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba I), 555 F.3d 1022, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
441
Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II), 605 F.3d 1046, 1051–52 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(per curiam); see generally Caprice L. Roberts, Rights, Remedies, and Habeas Corpus—The
Uighurs, Legally Free While Actually Imprisoned, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2009) (discussing the
detention of Uighurs at Guantánamo Bay). Three Uighur detainees remain at Guantá-
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A careful examination of the Boumediene Court’s multifactor test
defining the extraterritorial reach of the Suspension Clause is beyond
the scope of this Article. As noted, that standard incorporates due
process in a manner inconsistent with the traditional habeas focus on
whether there is jurisdiction over the jailer.442 The malleability of the
Court’s jurisdictional test was all too clear when, in Al Maqaleh v. Gates,
the D.C. Circuit grappled with habeas petitions filed by persons captured outside Afghanistan but detained at the Bagram Air Force Base
in Afghanistan.443 The D.C. Circuit rejected any “bright-line” jurisdictional rule, choosing instead to follow the factor-based Boumediene
analysis.444 In analyzing the first factor, the court acknowledged that
the process by which the detainees’ status had been determined was
even less protective—and therefore less adequate—than CSRT process at Guantánamo.445 The “due process” factor weighed heavily in
favor of extending the writ, but the court gave it little weight.446 Instead, the court found that the place of detention and practical factors
weighed conclusively against the writ, emphasizing that “Bagram, indeed the entire nation of Afghanistan, remains a theater of war.”447
With the number of detainees currently at Bagram greater than the
dwindling number of detainees at Guantánamo (though authority
over the base has been transferred to Afghan authorities),448 the ruling undercuts Boumediene.449 Still, habeas influences the Executive,
which has resulted in modestly enhanced CSRT-type review procedures at Bagram, perhaps in anticipation of a future Supreme Court
ruling on the detentions.450

namo Bay as of this writing. Jane Sutton, Two Uighur Detainees Sent to El Salvador, WASH.
POST, Apr. 20, 2012, at A9.
442
See supra Part II.D.
443
See 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
444
Id. at 95.
445
Id. at 96.
446
Id. at 97.
447
Id.
448
See Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 319, at 851–54; Huq, supra note 236, at 403–07; see
also Rod Nordland, Detainees Are Handed over to Afghans, but Not out of Americans’ Reach, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2012, at A4 (discussing the change of control over detainees in
Afghanistan).
449
The government may have strategically chosen places of detention, such as
Bagram, in an attempt to avoid the Boumediene analysis. Cf. Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 98–99
(dismissing such an argument but noting that the “manipulation by the Executive” in deliberately confining detainees in a theater of war was a potential additional factor in the
analysis).
450
See Michael J. Buxton, Note, No Habeas for You! Al Maqaleh v. Gates, the Bagram
Detainees, and the Global Insurgency, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 519, 523–33 (2010).
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JUDICIAL REVIEW

A. Habeas Process as an Organizing Principle
The Suspension Clause casts a broad shadow over the regulation
of all forms of detention. It has exerted direct and indirect influence
even in contexts where statutes largely supplant habeas corpus as the
primary vehicle for judicial review. The Executive, courts, and Congress have long been concerned with avoiding Suspension Clause
problems, and the Supreme Court’s own sometimes-carried-out warnings that it will narrowly interpret efforts to restrict judicial review to
avoid potential Suspension Clause problems have, many years before
Boumediene, helped to structure judicial review of detention. I have
argued that the Suspension Clause explains why, as the Court put it in
INS v. St. Cyr, “[a]t its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has
served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and
it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.”451 PostBoumediene, judges may rely on the Suspension Clause more directly,
and not just as a principle of constitutional avoidance. Understanding
the Suspension Clause as affirmatively guaranteeing a right to habeas
process to independently examine the authorization for a detention
helps to explain habeas and constitutional doctrine across a range of
areas.
Why does habeas corpus sometimes provide access to process unavailable under the Due Process Clause, while sometimes due process
provides more process than habeas would? At its core, habeas corpus
provides judges with process in situations where the need for review of
legal and factual questions surrounding detention is most pressing.
This view of habeas process can be seen as related to the Court’s long
line of decisions that guarantee a “right of access” to courts without
clarifying the source of that “[s]ubstantive [r]ight.”452 In Boumediene,
the Court grounded that right in the Suspension Clause.
This basis for the right makes some sense of the varied nature of
habeas review in which statutes and case law differ depending on the
type of detention. Judicial review does not vary categorically; for example, immigration does not receive less review than postconviction
or military detention habeas. Instead, judicial review varies within
each category. This is the product of evolving executive detention
policies, varying postconviction practice, and changes over time in
federal statutes, some poorly conceived and some sensible. No one
actor provides coherence to habeas practice at any time, and some of
the statutes are notoriously Byzantine, poorly drafted, and illogical.
451
452

533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).
See Vladeck, supra note 30, at 2125–26.
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Judges have long played, however, an important role in interpreting
the writ (and the underlying constitutional rights). Indeed, for some
time, the Supreme Court’s interventions have reinforced the role
habeas plays, particularly in the executive detention context. In response to the Court’s habeas rulings, which generally avoid defining
the precise reach of the Suspension Clause, Congress has drafted statutes to preserve judicial review of detentions in an effort to steer clear
of Suspension Clause problems, with mixed results.
As developed in Part I, despite changes over time, federal habeas
review of executive detentions has been broad and flexible since its
inception. The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, has remained
largely unchanged. Courts provide more process where the Executive
detains a person, particularly indefinitely, and where legal or factual
questions remain unexplored.453 In important respects, immigration
habeas, postconviction habeas, and civil detention avoid Suspension
Clause problems by preserving traditional habeas process where there
has been no prior judicial review.454 I discuss each type of habeas in
turn.
Immigration habeas is terribly complex, with judicial review shifting based on detailed statutes, case law, the type of noncitizen, and
the type of removal proceeding. Congress has haphazardly intervened and created sometimes-arbitrary distinctions, with dramatic
consequences for noncitizens. However, a focus on habeas process
can shed some light on this thorny area. As noted, courts substantially
defer to the government in decisions regarding removal at the border,
where the substantive law falls within the congressional plenary power
and due process offers little protection.455 Yet, even in the immigration context, statutes have provided that habeas ensure judicial review
of key disputed questions of law and certain factual questions, in part
because Congress has sought to avoid Suspension Clause problems.456
An “innocence of deportation” claim, in which the detainee
claims that he or she is a U.S. citizen and immune to deportation, is
perhaps most prominent, even if such claims are infrequent. Immigration statutes provide that such claims must receive de novo review
(now in petitions for review filed in courts of appeals).457 Of course,
453

See supra notes 357–59, 369 and accompanying text.
See infra Table 1.
455
See supra note 171 and accompanying text. Extradition is also a special case where
deference to foreign policy and treaty obligations justify narrow judicial review. Fernandez
v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925).
456
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
457
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B) (2006) (permitting “a new hearing on the nationality
claim” if the court of appeals concludes that there is a “genuine issue of material fact”).
Federal courts describe transfers as requiring a “de novo” hearing, akin to summary judgment review. See, e.g., Ramirez-Garcia v. Holder, 358 F. App’x 873, 874 (9th Cir. 2009).

R

454
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nondeportability of citizens is a substantive due process issue. In
1922, the Court held, in Ng Fung Ho v. White, that to deport a detainee
claiming to be a U.S. citizen “obviously deprives him of liberty,” and
that “[j]urisdiction in the executive to order deportation exists only if
the person arrested is an alien. The claim of citizenship is thus a denial of an essential jurisdictional fact.”458 As the Court explained in
Agosto v. INS in 1978, “In carving out this class of cases, Congress was
aware of our past decisions holding that the Constitution requires that
there be some provision for de novo judicial determination of claims to
American citizenship in deportation proceedings.”459 Similar concerns animated other standards associated with citizenship. In Woodby
v. INS, dealing with deportation, the Court held that “clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence” was the agency-level standard of proof
regarding citizenship claims; the Court held this without clearly citing
to the Due Process Clause as the authority for that requirement, but
by connecting it to the criminal case constitutional standard and citing to the great hardships deportations cause.460
The 2005 REAL ID Act centers judicial review in petitions of review at the courts of appeals.461 In enacting the REAL ID Act, Congress was aware of Supreme Court rulings, and it responded most
directly to the Court’s St. Cyr ruling striking down prior restrictions on
habeas litigation by certain categories of noncitizens.462 Accordingly,
the Act preserved judicial review of questions of law and constitutional
questions (for which, as noted, courts may also reach mixed questions).463 The Act contained an exception to permit habeas review of
claims related to the status of the person in expedited removal proceedings, for which very little process is supplied.464 These may include claims that the person is not a noncitizen ordered removed at
all but actually a citizen, a lawful permanent resident, a refugee, a
person not ordered removed, or a person granted asylum.465 Perhaps
courts may interpret those exceptions broadly over time. After all, in
458
259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). For an earlier decision taking an inconsistent approach,
see United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 261–64 (1905) (dismissing a petition alleging
citizenship that “disclosed neither abuse of authority nor the existence of evidence not laid
before the Secretary”).
459
436 U.S. 748, 753 (1978).
460
385 U.S. 276, 285–86 (1966); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (“In the proceeding the Service has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that, in the
case of an alien who has been admitted to the United States, the alien is deportable.”); 8
C.F.R. § 1240.8(c) (2012) (“[T]he Service must first establish the alienage of the respondent.”). In contrast, the statute places the burden on a noncitizen contesting inadmissibility grounds. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2).
461
See supra note 360 and accompanying text.
462
See supra note 360 and accompanying text.
463
See supra note 360 and accompanying text.
464
8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2).
465
Id.

R
R
R
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earlier immigration rulings like Heikkila v. Barber, the Court found
that despite the existence of statutes precluding judicial review “to the
maximum extent possible under the Constitution,” habeas corpus was
still available.466 The Heikkila Court did not explain why habeas
corpus was still available—it simply noted the “nature of the writ” and
“the scope of inquiry on habeas corpus” that differentiated habeas
corpus from purely statutory judicial review—but the Suspension
Clause provides a sensible explanation.467
This explanation makes still more sense when examining the
Court’s Ludecke v. Watkins decision, affirming the district court’s denial of the habeas petition and upholding authority to deport under
the Alien Enemy Act of 1798.468 The Court noted that judges entertaining such habeas petitions could examine legal questions and jurisdictional facts, that is, “the construction and validity of the statute”
and whether “the person restrained is in fact an alien enemy.”469
Again, the Court did not cite to the Suspension Clause, but it provides
the plausible source for that judicial authority.
The Suspension Clause may cast its shadow over other areas as
well. Lengthy or indefinite detention may be of even greater Suspension Clause concern. For example, in Zadvydas v. Davis the Court
held, to avoid reaching constitutional questions, that where a noncitizen is in indefinite detention, its interpretation of specific statutes
required the government to make a detailed and “sufficient” showing
at the immigration hearing.470 Federal courts have carefully scrutinized detention pending removal even in cases involving “mandatory”
detentions of criminal aliens (which the Court approved in Demore v.
Kim).471 These rulings in habeas challenges to mandatory detention
do not cite to the Suspension Clause, and instead rely upon the Due
Process Clause. However, sometimes the relationship between the
Due Process and Suspension Clauses is overdetermined. Substantive
due process may overlap with the Suspension Clause in its concern for
broader judicial scrutiny where there is lengthy or indefinite
detention.
In contrast to those situations requiring elevated judicial review,
much of immigration decision making relates to discretionary agency
decisions. The REAL ID Act eliminates judicial review over such deci466
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 311–12 (2001) (citing Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229,
235 (1953)).
467
Heikkila, 345 U.S. at 235–36.
468
335 U.S. 160, 163–73 (1948).
469
Id.
470
533 U.S. 678, 699–702 (2001).
471
See 538 U.S. 510, 529–31 (2003); ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 360, at 1257 (“Somewhat surprisingly, the lower courts have found significant constraints on lengthy detention
. . . despite the Supreme Court’s apparent endorsement of that provision in Demore.”).
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sions as to factual challenges but preserves review of questions of law
and constitutional questions.472 Congress created an alternative to
habeas corpus, providing for limited “substantial-evidence” or sufficiency-of-the-evidence review in the courts of appeals regarding factual questions and de novo review of “questions of law” and
constitutional claims.473 As noted, courts range in their interpretation
of what is a “question of law.” Tellingly, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, when explaining the need to flexibly interpret that language,
cited INS v. St. Cyr and the demands of the Suspension Clause: “The
Conference Report makes clear that Congress, in enacting the REAL
ID Act, sought to avoid the constitutional concerns outlined by the
Supreme Court in St. Cyr, which stated that as a result of the Suspension Clause, ‘some judicial intervention in deportation cases is unquestionably required by the Constitution . . . .’”474
The REAL ID Act not only eliminates judicial review of factual
questions regarding discretionary decisions, but it also eliminates judicial review for criminal aliens, perhaps because they received process
when convicted of an enumerated crime at trial (or when pleading
guilty).475 As to criminal convicts, review remains over legal questions,
including the question of whether a court convicted the defendant of
one of the (excessively broad and ill-defined) array of crimes qualifying as grounds for removal. Courts have expanded mixed-question
review of facts relevant to that legal question as well.476 The Court in
St. Cyr cited to the Suspension Clause when it narrowly construed statutes stripping judicial review of detention.477
Extradition also provides an example of highly limited review of
noncitizen removal. In 1925, the Supreme Court set out a standard in
which the reviewing court asks “whether the magistrate had jurisdic472
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (D) (2006) (stating that no court has the authority to
review listed waivers and matters committed to official discretion, excepting asylum, and
preserving judicial review of constitutional claims and questions of law).
473
See id.; id. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
474
Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 326 (2d Cir. 2006) (footnote
omitted) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 (2001)).
475
Noncitizens may also waive judicial review. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1187(b)(2).
476
Judges (and the Executive) have increasingly reached further to examine facts, including facts not part of the criminal record, to decide whether a court convicted a noncitizen of a deportable offense. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 36–37 (2009) (holding
that the question of loss to the victim “calls for a ‘circumstance-specific,’ not a ‘categorical,’
interpretation”); Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 708 (Att’y Gen. 2008) (adopting an
approach permitting the judge in an immigration case to consider “any additional evidence or factfinding” to decide if the crime was one “involving moral turpitude”). See
generally Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical
Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669 (2011) (criticizing the disarray caused
by departures from the traditional categorical approach); Jeremiah J. Farrelly, Note, Denying Formalism’s Apologists: Reforming Immigration Law’s CIMT Analysis, 82 U. COLO. L. REV.
877 (2011) (same).
477
533 U.S. at 304–05.
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tion, whether the offence charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the
finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused
guilty.”478 Extradition is treaty based and involves diplomatic issues,
but there is another explanation for the traditionally limited judicial
review: although extradition may not involve much in the way of prior
judicial process, the process that does exist takes the form of a magistrate finding probable cause. Following the magistrate’s determination, however, there is the anticipation of future judicial process: the
individual will receive full criminal process in a foreign court. This
explains, perhaps, the very limited judicial review prior to
extradition.479
Summarizing the procedures in each area of habeas corpus discussed, Table 1 below illustrates the inverse relationship between
habeas corpus and due process. In key areas, the broadest habeas process is provided where process lacked in prior proceedings, while
more deferential review occurs where there was more substantial prior
process, in part due to the influence of the Suspension Clause.

478

Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925).
Habeas jurisdiction remains over petitions challenging the legality of the extradition proceedings and the Secretary of State’s compliance with domestic law, despite the
REAL ID Act’s consolidation of many immigration challenges in the courts of appeals,
since such petitions do not challenge final orders of removal. Trinidad y Garcia v.
Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam).
479
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OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Type of Review

Full Habeas Process

Habeas Review of
Prior Process

Due Process at Prior
Proceeding

Military Detention

Broad review under
28 U.S.C. § 2241 and
Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723 (2008).

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507 (2004),
language on due
process standard for
review.
Deferential review of
prior military commission trial.

Possibly prior CSRT;
Boumediene did not
address whether
CSRTs comply with
due process.
Prior military commission trial (Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763
(1950)).

Postconviction

Evidentiary hearings
and discovery where
new, undeveloped
facts or new and retroactive legal rules
(e.g., 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)) are at issue.

Deferential review of
legal rulings, nonretroactivity, and deference to prior trial,
appeal, or postconviction fact-finding
(e.g., 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2254(b), (d),
(e)(1)).

Prior criminal trial
or waiver by guilty
plea; a final conviction receives deference, but due process requires “beyond-a-reasonabledoubt” proof at trial
and an array of procedural protections.

Immigration Detention

De novo review of
citizenship claims
under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(5)(B).
Habeas review of status for expedited removal under 8
U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2).

“Substantial-evidence” or sufficiency-of-the-evidence
nonhabeas review of
noncriminal removal
and asylum
(8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)
(4)(B)).
“Some-evidence” due
process review of extradition, removal of
criminal aliens.

Plenary power permits broad bases for
removal.
At agency hearing,
clear-and-convincingevidence standard
for deportation (8
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)
(A); Woodby v. INS,
385 U.S. 276,
(1966)).
Searching review of
length of detention
(Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678
(2001)).

AND

DUE PROCESS

As depicted above, where due process rulings or statutes already
provide for substantial prior process, habeas process may do less work
to supplement process provided, and statutes and case law may restrict
judicial review. Prior administrative process may receive comparatively more deference in situations in which there has been prior judicial process (i.e., criminal aliens provisions) or where the detention
standard is not very fact sensitive; in contrast, key jurisdictional facts
and questions of status may receive de novo review despite prior administrative process. Even in the enemy combatant context, review
may be more limited where the government conducted a full-fledged
military trial; as discussed, the Court’s Boumediene decision distinguished Eisentrager for that reason.480
480

See supra notes 314–17 and accompanying text.
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In contrast, in the postconviction setting, as developed in Part I,
habeas corpus has long required less demanding review. This is particularly so where criminal procedure offered due process at trial. Yet
even in postconviction review, as discussed next, new facts and evidence of innocence alter judicial review. Complex constitutional and
statutory rules concerning evidentiary hearings, Brady disclosures of
exculpatory evidence, innocence and other “gateway” claims all facilitate access to new evidence and preserve some role for a federal judge
(although, in my view, not an adequate ability to review new evidence
of innocence).
One additional category of detention not included in Table 1 is
civil detention, such as commitment of the mentally ill, for which, as
noted, the Court requires “clear and convincing evidence” supporting
the detention at a trial-like adversary proceeding.481 Those substantive due process standards relate to the initial detention. Given the
role substantive due process plays in such cases, habeas plays a limited
role. As the Court has noted, because the ongoing basis for a civil
commitment or the conditions of confinement may be revisited and
challenged in civil rights actions, such civil suits provide far more useful tools for civil detainees than habeas challenges.482
Viewing habeas corpus as an institution reveals both an important
common structure—despite changing case law, practice, and statutes
over time—and certain inadequacies and potential constitutional
flaws in statutes in some areas. The “full habeas process” column of
Table 1 is particularly telling. While military detention, immigration
detention, and postconviction habeas involve review of different types
of detention following different process, statutes and case law preserve
full habeas process in some places when it is most needed. Habeas
retains its greatest force in contexts in which there has been less prior
process and where factual and legal issues have not received adequate
judicial review.
A substantive view of the Suspension Clause has implications for
understanding habeas corpus across its range of applications and for
answering unsettled questions surrounding habeas review. For example, judicial interpretation of the REAL ID Act in immigration habeas
cases could hinge on whether the agency conducts adequate factual
review, or on whether the applicable statutes preserve sufficient judi-

481

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 263 (2001) (noting the availability of appeals and
injunctive remedies and explaining that “confinement is not a fixed event”); Martin v.
Bartow, 628 F.3d 871, 877 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a determination that a person is
a sexual offender is “constantly and forever disputable as a matter of constitutional law”).
482
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cial review of mixed factual and legal questions.483 The foregoing
analysis suggests that where a statute is silent on review of mixed questions and factual questions, courts should maximize judicial review
where prior fact development is inadequate, and habeas corpus
should supply the standard.484 As discussed next, this view of the Suspension Clause has implications for postconviction habeas, in which
scope of factual review is contested, particularly for claims of
innocence.
B. Three Hypotheticals
How much of a difference does it make whether judges examine
the authorization for a detention under a habeas corpus process or
whether they determine if procedures comport with due process? To
press the role of the distinction in Boumediene and Chief Justice Roberts’s concern that CSRT procedures supplied adequate process,485
suppose Congress legislates a set of enhanced CSRTs. Perhaps these
CSRTs include the D.C. Circuit’s adopted standards for habeas hearings: discovery of potentially exculpatory evidence, a preponderance
standard of review, a right to retain counsel, and the ability to rebut
the government’s case.486 A due process approach would simply ask
whether that set of procedures comports with the minimal Mathews
standards following the Hamdi analysis.487 Under the Suspension
Clause, a judge would question whether the scheme provided an adequate and effective alternative to full habeas review by an Article III
judge.488 Even though these hypothetical procedures are more robust, they do not resemble the alternatives to habeas the Court has
previously approved, which streamlined, but maintained the
equivalent of, full habeas review with federal judges. Further, a preliminary administrative procedure to screen detainees’ status does not
absolve federal judges of their independent obligation to review the
authorization for each detention. On the other hand, a statute could
require federal judges to defer, in some respects, to the record or
findings of an enhanced set of CSRTs.
483
Motomura, supra note 354, at 486–91 (discussing the REAL ID Act and advocating
a “direct review” model, arguing that the “collateral review” model is insufficient without a
prior formal process in which the facts are laid bare).
484
Aaron G. Leiderman, Note, Preserving the Constitution’s Most Important Human Right:
Judicial Review of Mixed Questions Under the REAL ID Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1368
(2006) (urging courts to “defer to agency findings of historical facts, but to engage in de
novo review of . . . determinations that a given set of facts do or do not rise to the relevant
legal standard”).
485
See supra notes 293–96 and accompanying text.
486
See supra Part III.
487
See supra Part II.A.1.
488
See supra Part II.B.2.
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Take a second hypothetical: Imagine that in a future conflict the
military detains many tens of thousands of prisoners of war
(POWs).489 Each detainee receives the privileges of POW status, including, if his or her status is unclear, military hearings under Article
5 of the Geneva Conventions. Such hearings may, however, be quite
rudimentary, involving a “competent tribunal” that has no required
procedures (implementing Army Regulations describe the U.S. procedures).490 Suppose many thousands of POWs demand access to
habeas, claiming they were not combatants for an enemy state, but
were private mercenaries or noncombatants that the government
should release.491
One could imagine strong practical incentives for federal courts
to postpone resolution of such difficult questions, particularly if
thousands held as POWs raised such claims. A court might rely on
jurisdictional grounds to refuse to hear petitions, citing to practical
impediments, just as the D.C. Circuit did in Al Maqaleh.492 The
Boumediene Court’s jurisdictional test left open that possibility for future conventional or unconventional conflicts.
Now, assume the POWs are detained at a military base in the territorial United States or at Guantánamo Bay. Boumediene would be
squarely on point. Military hearings may provide limited screening to
ascertain POW status, but they are not an adequate substitute for
habeas corpus. Judges considering habeas petitions would examine
the authorization for detention in each individual case. One could
easily imagine federal courts developing reasons to abstain. However,
a due process approach would make deference far simpler, although a
lengthy detention, perhaps after hostilities were over and without process beyond the initial “competent tribunal,” might raise real due process concerns. In contrast, the Suspension Clause approach would, at
489
For a discussion of advantages and disadvantages of treating al-Qaeda operatives as
combatants and affording them prisoner-of-war status, despite al-Qaeda’s lack of a “state”
or “army,” see David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating Al Qaeda Within the Law of War,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 957, 1001–02 (2009).
490
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 5, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 190-8,
ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND OTHER DETAINEES
(1997) [hereinafter ARMY REGULATION 190-8], available at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r190_8.pdf; see also Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of
Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1091 (2008) (describing past
and present U.S. procedures and comparing said procedures with several allied nations’
procedures).
491
Army Regulation 190-8 provides that the tribunal may recommend such release of
an “innocent civilian.” See ARMY REGULATION 190-8, supra note 490, § 1-6e(10). Perhaps
few combatants would contest their status though, as “the desire to obtain the benefits of
POW status ordinarily would encourage captured soldiers to concede their associational
status, not deny it.” Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 490, at 1089.
492
See supra notes 443–47 and accompanying text.
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a minimum, force judges to acknowledge that they were avoiding a
responsibility to examine whether individuals were in fact properly
held as POWs, perhaps in deference to military concerns.
Third, suppose Congress created a national security court with
Article III judges that used highly streamlined procedures (much like
the CSRTs) and provided detainees with advisers, but not lawyers, and
little access to discovery.493 In this hypothetical, the due process analysis would largely overlap with the habeas analysis. There might be
questions under Hamdi as to whether these procedures are minimally
adequate. There might also be questions as to whether the procedures provide an adequate and effective substitute for habeas, since,
though an Article III judge sits on the case, it is unclear if this type of
judge would have the traditional authority to examine authorization
for the detention and provide relief. The Boumediene Court emphasized that “deference” can be appropriate to sufficient prior judicial
process; however the Court also emphasized that access to exculpatory
evidence was “constitutionally required.”494 The Court added that
military courts might be sufficient, but only if they had a sufficiently
“adversarial structure” that included providing counsel.495
Thus, judges examining habeas corpus and due process ask different questions and do not always provide the same answer. A judge
examining a due process claim asks whether general procedures are
adequate; a federal judge examining habeas process asks whether
there is an adequate opportunity to review the authorization of the
detention for each detainee. There may be reasons for judges to abstain or defer to Congress and the Executive, but if judges squarely
face the question, the Suspension Clause requires that the judge retain full power to meaningfully review the factual and legal authorization for the detention.
C. Innocence and the Suspension Clause
Habeas process involves a sort of innocence claim. Detainees argue that the government illegally detained them or that factually they
are not the type of person the government can legally detain. I have
developed how judges conducting a habeas process, grounded in the
Suspension Clause, must be intimately concerned with factual error
493
Commentators have proposed that such courts be created. See generally Amos N.
Guiora, Creating a Domestic Terror Court, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 617 (2009) (exploring potential
processes and complications for such a court); Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Case for a National
Security Court, ATLANTIC, Feb. 2007, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/
02/the-case-for-a-national-security-court/305717/ (arguing in favor of these courts).
494
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 781–82, 786 (2008).
495
Id. at 786–87.
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and not just review of questions of law. Such a view has important
implications for domestic habeas.496
Since its 1993 Herrera v. Collins497 decision, the Supreme Court
has failed to recognize, except for the sake of argument, that innocence alone could be a basis for a constitutional entitlement to postconviction relief. The Herrera Court noted that such a claim would be
“disruptive of our federal system” and “federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution—not to correct errors of fact.”498 The Court assumed that any
such claim of innocence would require a “truly persuasive” showing.499 Federal courts have yet to release a convict on the basis of a
hypothetical “truly persuasive” Herrera claim (and I have developed
how even innocent convicts, including those later exonerated by
DNA, tried and failed to assert such claims).500 The Court does, however, permit a showing of innocence to excuse procedural barriers
that would otherwise bar review of claims, and the Court has indicated
that this hypothetical innocence claim may be asserted in noncapital
cases.501
What Boumediene and executive detention jurisprudence highlight
is that habeas at its core is centrally preoccupied with examining facts
or questions of innocence. Justice Lewis Powell wrote, “[H]istory
reveals no exact tie of the writ of habeas corpus to a constitutional
claim relating to innocence or guilt.”502 That is incorrect. In detention cases, judges must examine innocence or guilt absent any “constitutional claim” at all when performing the core of their habeas
function. As Gerald Neuman has suggested, following Boumediene, the
Court’s failure to recognize a freestanding claim of innocence may
stand on weaker constitutional ground.503 A claim of innocence
could be grounded in the Due Process Clause, its “natural foundation,”504 whether a court uses a Mathews balancing approach concerned with risk of error, or a fundamental fairness approach under
which an innocent prisoner has a “powerful and legitimate interest in
496
Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal
Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 837 (2009) (suggesting that the “proposed cutback” of habeas
may be unconstitutional if states “fail to maintain robust postconviction review”).
497
506 U.S. 390 (1993).
498
Id. at 400–01.
499
Id. at 417.
500
Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1691–92 (2008).
501
See Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 72 (2009); Schlup v. Delo, 513
U.S. 298, 321 (1995).
502
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 257 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
503
Neuman, supra note 30, at 563–64 (noting that “the Boumediene balancing methodology could supply a new doctrinal foundation” for a Herrera-type innocence claim).
504
Garrett, supra note 500, at 1704.
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obtaining his release from custody.”505 Boumediene suggests that a
claim of innocence could be grounded in the Suspension Clause (perhaps informing a due process claim, if a federal question claim could
not be premised directly on the Suspension Clause). If no prior court
adequately examined new evidence of innocence, perhaps courts
should mandate federal habeas review.506
Jurisprudence emerging from Boumediene, with its focus on factual reliability, may also indirectly influence constitutional criminal
procedure. Judges may use similar rules to assess hearsay or confession evidence in other contexts in which the reliability of such evidence is important, perhaps including in posttrial cases raising claims
of innocence. As scholars and courts try to improve accuracy and reliability of evidentiary rules, that case law may become salient.507
CONCLUSION
The Suspension Clause has long cast a shadow over the regulation of detention. Now the Supreme Court has brought the Clause
out of the shadows, giving it substance. It does not merely describe
when the government may suspend the writ, nor does it solely reflect
an important principle of constitutional avoidance in interpreting
statutes that restrict judicial review of detention. Instead, the Clause
affirmatively offers a simple but powerful form of process to detainees.
Moreover, the Court emphasized a Suspension Clause concern with
both legal and factual error. This Article has explored this new understanding of the Suspension Clause in light of the changing and
unsettled relationship between two complex areas of law: due process
and habeas corpus. Both “due process and habeas corpus are quite
general, amorphous, and capacious” in their content.508 Despite ring505

Id. at 1705 (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452 (1986)).
Currently, a federal court may grant an evidentiary hearing to develop facts a state
court failed to develop, but it may not necessarily rely on facts undeveloped in state proceedings when ruling on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2006); Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (holding that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the
record presented to the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits); Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) does not bar an
evidentiary hearing where a prisoner “was unable to develop his claim in state court despite diligent effort”). The Court also suggested a claim of innocence could be pursued in
federal habeas discovery despite failure to recognize such a claim. Dist. Attorney’s Office v.
Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 72–73 (2009).
507
See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 265–74 (2011) (advocating for criminal procedure reforms to improve
accuracy); Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back in: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 486 (advocating reliability review of
confessions). See generally State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011) (adopting social
science framework to regulate eyewitness evidence).
508
Carl Tobias, The Process Due Indefinitely Detained Citizens, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1687, 1720
(2007).
506
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ing language uniting habeas and due process in a tradition dating
back to Magna Carta, habeas and due process cover importantly different terrain. The Suspension Clause supplies process in circumstances where the Due Process Clause does not apply, while due
process has varied applications outside areas covered by habeas
corpus. In executive detentions, however, the Suspension Clause
plays an outsized role.
Taken seriously, the Court in Hamdi and Boumediene forged a relationship between the Suspension Clause and the Due Process Clause.
Nelson Tebbe and Robert Tsai examined what circumstances justify
“constitutional borrowing” and noted concerns where there is a lack
of fit, a lack of transparency, and incomplete application from one
area of constitutional law to another.509 In Boumediene, the Court was
careful not to explicitly borrow due process standards. The Court’s
caution was justified. While due process analysis focuses on adequacy
of procedures, habeas process provides the authority for judges to examine the factual and legal authorization for detention. Though
habeas process may be “skeletal” in its outlines, both at common law
and in modern federal statutes, it provides judges a powerful tool. In
significant ways, complex and sometimes poorly conceived distinctions in statutes nevertheless respect core habeas process, in part due
to the judicial interventions. I have argued that Boumediene was no
innovation, but rather it followed the longstanding view that habeas is
at its most expansive concerning detention without a trial.
The Suspension Clause demands that habeas corpus remain in
full force where there was no adequate prior judicial process, particularly in the context of indefinite detentions. This places the judiciary
in the uncomfortable position of reviewing broad congressional authorizations for detentions and changing executive procedures in factually and legally contested detainee petitions. Thrust into that
difficult role, lower courts have often relied upon inapposite sources,
hewing to some vision of a bare constitutional minimum rather than
providing a meaningful habeas process. The D.C. Circuit approves a
standard of proof that is too lenient as defined, if not also in application. Its approach unduly limits discovery and uses an odd harmless
error rule. In other respects, rulings have done a better job harmonizing evidentiary and criminal procedure rules with habeas process.
Careful application could avoid unfortunate rulings, with an exception: the decision not to extend habeas to Bagram was partially due to
Boumediene’s misstep in adopting a multifactored jurisdictional test.510
509
Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459,
494–507 (2010).
510
See supra notes 442–47 and accompanying text.
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Congress has preserved the central role of the judiciary in the
contest over what procedures should govern review of national security detention. Although the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012 contains broad authorization for detention, it does
not alter or address procedural aspects of judicial review, despite calls
to do so.511 Perhaps Congress has reached a stable equilibrium.
Judges’ approaches to future detentions and detention legislation in
future conflicts will focus on the Suspension Clause question. If Congress centers review in an enhanced version of CSRTs, if POWs receive
military hearings and demand access to habeas, or if Congress creates
a national security court with Article III judges but streamlined procedure, courts will ask whether each is an adequate and effective substitute for habeas, and not simply whether general procedures satisfy
due process. In some cases, the answer might be the same under a
habeas or due process approach, but only if judges retain the power to
adequately review authorization for detentions. Moreover, Boumediene
will continue to impact all of habeas corpus, ranging from judicial
review under immigration statutes to central questions in postconviction law, including actual-innocence claims.
The connection between habeas corpus and due process has
been long celebrated. Daniel Meador heralded how “[f]lexibility to
meet new problems is one of the characteristics of both due process
and habeas corpus, and the value of the habeas corpus—due process
combination as protection against arbitrary imprisonment—can
hardly be exaggerated.”512 Yet the virtues of flexibility include the
vices of malleability. The Suspension Clause jurisprudence forged in
the wake of Hamdi and Boumediene suggests that connecting habeas
corpus and due process requires great care.
The structural role of the Suspension Clause is now firmly established. Contrary to expectations, after exerting its influence in the
shadows for so long, the Clause anchors a process animating the operation of far-flung aspects of habeas corpus, ranging from military detention, to immigration detention, to postconviction review. While
due process and habeas corpus overlap in some of the protections
they provide, a judge asks different questions when examining a due
process claim versus a habeas challenge to custody. A judge examining a due process claim will focus on the general adequacy of the procedures employed. A judge examining a habeas challenge will focus
on the legal and factual authorization of an individual detention, and
511
See WITTES ET AL., supra note 324, at 83 (arguing that courts “desperately need guidance” but “prospects of legislative intervention are . . . exceedingly remote”); Kuhn, supra
note 372, at 242 (describing congressional deference to current judicial process); supra
note 333 and accompanying text.
512
MEADOR, supra note 4, at 82–83.
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in more troubling cases, on the larger Suspension Clause question of
whether federal judges have an adequate and effective ability to examine that question of authorization. The roles of habeas and due
process are distinct and in important respects they share an inverse
relationship—habeas corpus can fill the breach when due process is
inadequate. The Suspension Clause ensures that habeas corpus serves
a powerful, independent, and unappreciated role standing alone.

